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Abstract
We present novel, computationally efficient, and differentially private algorithms for
two fundamental high-dimensional learning problems: learning a multivariate Gaussian in
Rd and learning a product distribution in {0, 1}d in total variation distance. The sample
complexity of our algorithms nearly matches the sample complexity of the optimal non-private
learners for these tasks in a wide range of parameters. Thus, our results show that private
comes essentially for free for these problems, providing a counterpoint to the many negative
results showing that privacy is often costly in high dimensions. Our algorithms introduce a
novel technical approach to reducing the sensitivity of the estimation procedure that we call
recursive private preconditioning, which may find additional applications.
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1 Introduction
A central problem in machine learning and statistics is to learn (estimate) the parameters of
an unknown distribution using samples. However, in many applications, these samples consist of
highly sensitive information belonging to individuals, and the output of the learning algorithm
may inadvertently reveal this information. While releasing only the estimated parameters of
a distribution may seem harmless, when there are enough parameters—that is, when the data
is high-dimensional—these statistics can reveal a lot of individual-specific information (see
e.g. [DN03, HSR+08, BUV14, DSS+15, SSSS17], and the survey [DSSU17]). For example, the
influential attack of Homer et al. [HSR+08] showed how to use very simple statistical information
released in the course of genome-wide association studies to detect the presence of individuals in
those studies, which implies these individuals have a particular medical condition. Thus it is
crucial to design learning algorithms that ensure the privacy of the individuals in the dataset.
The most widely accepted solution to this problem is differential privacy [DMNS06], which
provides strong individual privacy guarantees. A large body of literature now shows how to
implement nearly every statistical algorithm privately, and differential privacy is now being
deployed by Apple [Dif17], Google [EPK14], and the US Census Bureau [DLS+17].
A theme in differential privacy research is that privacy comes almost for free when data is
low-dimensional but incurs a steep price when data is high-dimensional. Consider the example of
mean estimation of a distribution over {0, 1}d. To privately estimate the mean of this distribution
up to ±α per coordinate, it is necessary [BUV14, SU17a] and sufficient [BDMN05, DMNS06] to
have n = Θ( 1
α2
+
√
d
α ) samples from the distribution, whereas Θ(
1
α2
) samples are necessary and
sufficient without privacy. In other words, there is almost no increase in sample complexity when
d is small, but a significant increase when d is large. Moreover, differentially private algorithms
for high-dimensional data often require exponential running time [DNR+09, Ull16].
This phenomenon is quite persistent. For example, an elegant recent work of Karwa and
Vadhan [KV18] shows how to estimate the parameters of a univariate Gaussian with no asymptotic
increase in sample complexity compared to non-private estimation, and the work of Diakonikolas,
Hardt, and Schmidt [DHS15] shows how to learn a variety of structured distributions over
a one-dimensional discrete domain with almost no increase in sample complexity. However,
extending these results to higher dimensions leads to a large blowup in sample complexity. Thus,
the general perception is that differential privacy is quite costly for high-dimensional learning.
In this work, we challenge this notion by presenting computationally efficient differentially
private algorithms for two fundamental high-dimensional learning problems—learning a mul-
tivariate Gaussian and learning a product distribution in total variation distance—that incur
only a small increase in sample complexity compared to non-private algorithms for the same
tasks. For Gaussians, a key feature of our results is that the sample complexity has only a mild
dependence on the condition number of the covariance matrix, whereas previous approaches to
these problems in high dimensions incur a polynomial dependence on the condition number. The
main new technical tool underlying our results is a new approach to reducing the sensitivity of the
estimation procedure—private recursive preconditioning—that may have additional applications.
1.1 Our Results
1.1.1 Privately Learning Gaussians
The most fundamental class of high-dimensional distributions is the multivariate Gaussian
in Rd. Our first result is an algorithm that takes samples from a distribution N (µ,Σ) with
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unknown mean µ ∈ Rd and covariance Σ ∈ Rd×d and estimates parameters µ̂, Σ̂ such that N (µ̂, Σ̂)
is close to the true distribution in total variation distance (TV distance). Without privacy,
n = Θ( d
2
α2
) samples suffice to guarantee total variation distance at most α (this is folklore, but
see e.g. [DKK+16]).
Despite the simplicity of this problem, it was only recently that Karwa and Vadhan [KV18]
gave an optimal algorithm for learning a univariate Gaussian. Specifically, they showed that just
n = O˜( 1
α2
+ 1αε +
log(Rκ)
ε ) samples are sufficient to learn a univariate Gaussian N (µ, σ2) with
|µ| ≤ R and 1 ≤ σ2 ≤ κ, up to α in total variation distance subject to ε-differential privacy. In
contrast to na¨ıve approaches, their result has two important features: (1) The sample complexity
has only mild dependence on the range parameters R and κ, and (2) the sample complexity
is only larger than that of the non-private estimator by a small multiplicative factor and an
additive factor that is a lower order term for a wide range of parameters. When the covariance is
unknown, a na¨ıve application of their algorithm would preserve neither of these features.
We show that it is possible to privately estimate a multivariate normal while preserving both
of these features. Our algorithms satisfy the strong notion of concentrated differential privacy
(zCDP) [DR16, BS16], which is formally defined in Section 2. To avoid confusion we remark that
these definitions are on different scales so that ε
2
2 -zCDP is comparable to ε-DP and (ε, δ)-DP.
Theorem 1.1. There is a polynomial time ε
2
2 -zCDP algorithm that takes
n = O˜
(
d2
α2
+
d2
αε
+
d3/2 log1/2 κ+ d1/2 logR
ε
)
samples from a Gaussian N (µ,Σ) with unknown mean µ ∈ Rd such that ‖µ‖2 ≤ R and unknown
covariance Σ ∈ Rd×d such that I  Σ  κI, and outputs estimates µ̂, Σ̂ such that, with high
probability dTV(N (µ,Σ),N (µ̂, Σ̂)) ≤ α. Here, O˜(·) hides polylogarithmic factors of d, 1α , 1ε , log κ,
and logR.
Theorem 1.1 will follow by combining Theorem 3.12 for covariance estimation with Theorem 4.3
for mean estimation. Observe that, since the sample complexity without privacy is Θ( d
2
α2
),
Theorem 1.1 shows that privacy comes almost for free unless 1ε , κ, or R are quite large.
The main difficulty that arises when trying to extend the results of [KV18] to the multivariate
case is that the covariance matrix of the Gaussian might be unknown and ill-conditioned. The
main technically novel part of our algorithm is a method for learning a matrix A approximating
the inverse of the covariance matrix so that I  AΣA  1000I. This matrix can be used to
transform the Gaussian to be nearly spherical, making it possible to apply the methods of [KV18].
Theorem 1.2 (Private Preconditioning). There is an ε
2
2 -zCDP algorithm that takes
n = O˜
(
d3/2 log1/2 κ
ε
)
samples from an unknown Gaussian N (0,Σ) over Rd with Σ ∈ Rd×d such that I  Σ  κI, and
outputs a symmetric matrix A such that I  AΣA  1000I. Here, O˜(·) hides polylogarithmic
factors of d, 1ε , and log κ.
We describe and analyze our algorithm for private covariance estimation in Section 3, and in
Section 4 we combine it with the algorithms of [KV18] to obtain Theorem 1.1.
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1.1.2 Privately Learning Product Distributions
The simplest family of high-dimensional discrete distributions are product distributions over
{0, 1}d. Without privacy, Θ( d
α2
) are necessary and sufficient to learn up to α in total variation
distance. The standard approach to achieving DP by perturbing each coordinate independently
requires Θ˜( d
α2
+ d
3/2
αε ) samples. We give an improved algorithm for this problem that avoids
this blowup in sample complexity. While our algorithm for learning product distributions is
quite different to our algorithm for estimating Gaussian covariance, it uses a similar recursive
preconditioning technique, highlighting the versatility of this approach.
Theorem 1.3. There is a polynomial time ε
2
2 -zCDP algorithm that takes
n = O˜
(
d
α2
+
d
αε
)
samples from an unknown product distribution P over {0, 1}d and outputs a product distribution
Q such that, with high probability, dTV(P,Q) ≤ α. Here, O˜(·) hides polylogarithmic factors of
d, 1α , and
1
ε .
We describe and analyze our algorithm in Section 5.
1.1.3 Lower Bounds
We prove lower bounds for the problems we consider in this paper, demonstrating that for
many problems, our sample complexity is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. One example
statement is the following lower bound for private mean estimation of a product distribution, for
the more permissive notion of (ε, δ)-differential privacy (compared to our upper bounds, which
are in terms of zCDP):
Theorem 1.4. Any (ε, 164n)-differentially private algorithm that takes samples from an arbitrary
unknown product distribution P over {0, 1}d and outputs a product distribution Q such that
dTV(P,Q) ≤ α with probability ≥ 9/10 requires n = Ω( dα2 + dαε log d) samples.
We also prove a qualitatively similar lower bound for privately estimating the mean of a
Gaussian distribution.
In addition, we prove lower bounds for privately estimating a Gaussian with unknown
covariance. These are qualitatively weaker, as they are only for ε-differential privacy, and we
consider it an interesting open question to prove lower bounds for covariance estimation under
concentrated or approximate differential privacy.
Theorem 1.5. Any ε-differentially private algorithm that takes samples from an arbitrary
unknown Gaussian distribution P and outputs a Gaussian distribution Q such that dTV(P,Q) ≤ α
with probability ≥ 9/10 requires n = Ω( d2
α2
+ d
2
αε) samples.
All our lower bounds are presented in Section 6.
1.1.4 Comparison to Lower Bounds for High-Dimensional DP
Readers familiar with differential privacy may wonder why our results do not contradict
known lower bounds for high-dimensional differential privacy [BUV14, SU15, DSS+15]. The two
3
key differences are (1) lower bounds showing that privacy is costly are for fairly weak estimation
guarantees whereas we want a rather stringent estimation guarantee, and (2) we exploit the
structure of Gaussians and product distributions to obtain guarantees that are not possible for
arbitrary distributions.
To understand the first issue, most lower bounds in differential privacy apply to estimating
the mean of the distribution up to α in `∞ distance. This guarantee can be achieved with Θ( log dα2 )
samples non-privately but requires Θ( log d
α2
+
√
d
α ) samples with differential privacy. Thus, for
this fairly weak estimation guarantee, privately is costly in high dimensions. However, if we
consider the more stringent `2 metric, then the cost of privacy goes away, and Θ(
d
α2
) samples are
sufficient with or without privacy. One way to justify this statement is that estimation up to
α/
√
d in `∞ implies estimation up to α in `2, so the non-private term and the private term in
the `∞ bounds have roughly the same dependence on the dimension in this case. Thus, for this
stronger estimation guarantee, privacy is not costly in high-dimensions. This phenomenon is
fairly general, and is not specific to Gaussians or product distributions.
To understand the second issue, in order to learn Gaussians or product distributions in total
variation distance, we need to learn in metrics that are related to `2, but take into account the
variance of the distribution. In the case of Gaussians we learn in the Mahalanobis distance ‖ · ‖Σ
and for product distributions our guarantees are for a variant of the KL-divergence. For example,
Theorem 1.1 can actually be rephrased as saying that, for our algorithm,
n = O˜
(
d3/2 log1/2 κ
ε
)
=⇒ ‖Σ− Σ̂‖Σ = O
(√
d2
n
+
d2
εn
)
.
This sort of guarantee where the error in the Σ-norm does not depend on the condition number
cannot be achieved for arbitrary distributions, and thus for this part of the guarantee we crucially
use the fact that the data is i.i.d. from a Gaussian. A similar phenomenon arises for product
distributions, where, as we show, learning in our chosen error metric requires just O˜(d) samples
for a product distributions: a consequence of our results is that we can learn the mean of a
product distribution over {0, 1}d in `2 using O˜(d) samples, but Ω(d3/2) samples would be required
to learn the mean of an arbitrary distribution in `2.
1.2 Techniques
1.2.1 Privately Learning Gaussians
To simplify the discussion, we focus only on covariance estimation, although the issues that
arise in mean estimation are similar. We also elide the privacy parameter ε, since it is not
central to the discussion. Suppose we want to estimate a zero-mean Gaussian N (0,Σ). Without
privacy we could draw n = O( d
2
α2
) i.i.d. samples X1, . . . , Xn and use the empirical covariance
Σ˜ = 1n
∑
iXiX
T
i , and, with high probability, dTV(N (0,Σ),N (0, Σ˜)) ≤ α.
A Na¨ıve Approach. If we want to make this procedure private, then we have to perturb each
entry of Σ˜ with independent noise whose standard deviation is proportional to the sensitivity
of the statistic Σ˜, which is the maximum that changing one sample can change Σ˜ in Frobenius
norm. The sensitivity of Σ is 1n times the largest possible `
2
2 norm of a sample Xi, so if we make
no assumption about distribution, then the sensitivity is unbounded. If we assume I  Σ  κI
then we can truncate the data so that ‖Xi‖22 . κd, which ensures that the sensitivity is . κdn ,
but does not affect the accuracy of the estimation procedure. However, if we have to add noise
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with standard deviation κdn to each entry of Σ˜ in order to achieve privacy, then we will need at
least n = Ω(κ
2d2
α ) samples to learn the covariance up to α in total variation distance.
Private Preconditioning. While this na¨ıve algorithm has an undesirable polynomial dependence
on the condition number κ, it allows us to essentially match the non-private sample complexity
when κ is a constant. Thus, in order to estimate the underlying Gaussian, it would suffice to
privately find a symmetric matrix A such that I  AΣA  1000I. Given such a matrix, we
can apply the na¨ıve algorithm to the data AX1, . . . , AXn, and learn the transformed covariance
AΣA, and essentially match the non-private sample complexity.
The challenge in finding such a matrix A is that the covariance Σ can be as large as κ in some
directions and as small as 1 in others, and we need essentially a good multiplicative estimate of
the variance in every direction. Suppose we start with the na¨ıve procedure, and let Σ̂ = Σ˜ + Z
where Z is a matrix whose entries have standard deviation κdn . Since the eigenvalues of Z are
≈ κd3/2n , this matrix Z can completely overwhelm the directions of Σ̂ that have low variance
unless n & κd3/2, making it impossible to obtain the desired matrix A such that I  AΣ  1000I.
On the other hand, if n & 1000d3/2, then the spectral norm of Z is at most κ1000 , so the noise
will not overwhelm the directions of large variance. Specifically, any eigenvector v of Σ̂ such that
the eigenvalue is λ ≥ κ100 must be close to a some eigenvector of Σ˜ with eigenvalue & κ100 .
Using this observation, we can try to reduce the sensitivity of Σ by shrinking the directions
of large variance. Specifically, let vi, λi be the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Σ̂ respectively, let
V = span({vi : λi ≥ κ2}) be the span of the directions with large variance, and let A = 12ΠV +ΠV ⊥
be the matrix that partially projects out the the subspace V . Then we can show that (after
some rescaling) I  AΣA  34κI. Thus we have improved the condition number by a constant
factor, and thereby decreased the sensitivity of the covariance estimation problem. We call
this procedure a private preconditioner. We can now apply this procedure recursively on the
distribution N (0, AΣA) for O(log κ) rounds to obtain the desired preconditioner, which, in turn,
allows us to obtain our final estimates of the mean and covariance.
1.2.2 Privately Learning Product Distributions
Although learning Boolean product distributions is quite different from learning Gaussians,
our algorithm uses a similar approach of recursively reducing the sensitivity. Suppose we have
a product distribution P over {0, 1}d with mean p = E[P ]. Without privacy, we could draw
n = O( d
α2
) i.i.d. samples X1, . . . , Xn, compute the empirical mean p˜ =
1
n
∑
iXi, and output the
product distribution P˜ with mean p˜. With high probability, we would have dTV(P, P˜ ) ≤ α.
A Na¨ıve Approach. Using the fact that the `2-sensitivity of the mean is
√
d
n , we can make
this procedure private by computing p̂ = p˜+ Z where Z is a vector whose entries have standard
deviation
√
d
n . Bounding the distance between P and P̂ requires some care, but for simplicity we
assume p  1d and use the approximately tight bound
dTV(P, P̂ ) ≤ O
√√√√∑
j
(pj − p̂j)2
pj

To upper bound this quantity, we need |pj − p̂j | ≤ α/d, which us to take Ω(d3/2α ) samples.
Recursive Preconditioning. We cannot independently improve either the sensitivity analysis or
the bound on distance. We can however, see how to get a win-win by considering two instructive
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cases: (1) If p = (12 , . . . ,
1
2) then every sample has `2 norm about
√
d/2, however it suffices to
ensure |pj − p̂j | ≤ α/
√
d to get a suitable distance bound. (2) If p = (1d , . . . ,
1
d) then we really
need |pj − p̂j | ≤ α/d, but we can also truncate the data so that ‖Xi‖2 . 1, which reduces the
sensitivity to . 1n but does not affect the accuracy of the estimates. In each of these two cases,
it would suffice to have O( d
α2
) samples to learn the distribution.
Extrapolating from these two cases, our approach is to partition the coordinates based on their
mean, and use appropriate truncation for each piece of the partition. The challenge, of course, is
to do the partitioning privately. Our partitioning is again based on recursive preconditioning
starting with the na¨ıve algorithm. Suppose that we use the na¨ıve algorithm with n ≈ d
α2
samples
so that for all j,
|pj − p̂j | . α/
√
d ≤ 1
16
If we consider any coordinate j such that p̂j ≥ 316 , then we know that pj ≥ 18 , so we have
(pj − p̂j)2
pj
. α
2
d
,
which is our goal for that coordinate. Thus, if we let P1, P̂1 be the distribution restricted to
coodinates with p̂j ≥ 316 we have dTV(P1, P̂1) ≤ α.
On the other hand, if p̂j <
3
16 then pj could be small, so we do not get a good distance bound
for this coordinate. However, we know that pj <
1
4 , meaning that if we restrict to the coordinates
with p̂j <
3
16 , we will have ‖Xi‖2 .
√
d/4, and we can reduce the sensitivity by a constant
factor using truncation. We can then recursively apply this procedure on the remaining variables
for O(log d) rounds until we have an accurate estimate for all coordinates. Each recursive call
requires drawing more samples, and introduces additional error, but this only increases the
overall sample complexity by polylogarithmic factors.
1.3 Additional Related Work
While the work on differentially private learning and statistics (to say nothing of differential
privacy as a whole) is too vast to survey here, we highlight some relevant lines of research.
Differentially Private Learning and Statistics. The most directly comparable papers to ours are
recents results on learning low-dimensional statistics. In addition to the aforementioned work of
Karwa and Vadhan [KV18], Bun, Nissim, Stemmer, and Vadhan [BNSV15] showed how to private
learn an arbitrary distribution in Kolmogorov distance, which is weaker than TV distance, with
almost no increase in sample complexity. Diakonikolas, Hardt, and Schmidt [DHS15] extended
this work to give a practical algorithm for learning structured one-dimensional distributions in
TV distance.
An elegant work of Smith [Smi11] showed how to estimate arbitrary asymptotically normal
statistics with only a small increase in sample complexity compared to non-private estimation.
Technically, this work doesn’t apply to covariance estimation or estimating sparse product
distributions, for which the asymptotic distribution is not normal. More fundamentally, this
algorithm learns a high-dimensional distribution one coordinate at a time, which is quite costly
for the distributions we consider here.
Covariance Estimation. For covariance estimation, the works closest to ours are that of
Dwork, Talwar, Thakurta, and Zhang [DTTZ14] and Sheffet [She17]. Their algorithms require
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that the norm of the data be bounded, and the sample complexity depends polynomially on this
bound. In contrast, our algorithms have either mild or no dependence on the norm of the data.
Robust Statistical Estimation on High-Dimensional Data. Recently, there has been significant
interest in the computer science community in robustly estimating distributions [DKK+16,
LRV16, CSV17, DKK+17, DKK+18, SCV18], where the goal is to estimate some distribution
from samples even when a constant fraction of the samples may be corrupted by an adversary.
As observed by Dwork and Lei [DL09], differentially private estimation and robust estimation
both seek to minimize the influence of outliers, and thus there is a natural conceptual connection
between these two problems. Technically, the two problems are incomparable. Differential
privacy seeks to limit the influence of outliers in a very strong sense, and without making any
assumptions on the data, but only when up to O(1/ε) samples are corrupted. In contrast, robust
estimation limits the influence of outliers in a weaker sense, and only when the remaining samples
are chosen from a nice distribution, but tolerates up to Ω(n) corruptions.
Differentially Private Testing. There have also been a number of works on differentially
private hypothesis testing. For example, [WLK15, GLRV16, KR17, CDK17, KSF17] gave private
algorithms for goodness-of-fit testing, closeness, and independence testing. Recently, [ASZ17]
and [ADR18] have given essentially optimal algorithms for goodness-of-fit and closeness testing of
arbitrary distributions. [AKSZ18] designed nearly optimal algorithms for estimating properties
like support size and entropy. [GR18, She18] study hypothesis testing in the local differential
privacy setting. All these works consider testing of arbitrary distributions, and so they necessarily
have sample complexity growing exponentially in the dimension.
Privacy Attacks and Lower Bounds. A complementary line of work has established limits
on the accuracy of private algorithms for high-dimensional learning. For example, Dwork et
al. [DSS+15] (building on [BUV14, HU14, SU15, SU17a]) designed a robust tracing attack that can
infer sensitive information about individuals in a dataset using highly noisy statistical information
about the dataset. These attacks apply to nice distributions like product distributions and
Gaussians, but require that the dataset be too small to learn the underlying distribution in total
variation distance, and thus do not contradict our results. These attacks apply to a number of
learning problems, such as PCA [DTTZ14], ERM [BST14], and variable selection [BU17, SU17b].
Similar attacks lead to computational hardness results for differentially private algorithms
for high-dimensional data [DNR+09, UV11, Ull16, KMUZ16, KMUW18], albeit for learning
problems that encode certain cryptographic functionalities.
2 Preliminaries
A dataset X = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ X n is a collection of elements from some universe. We say that
two datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n are neighboring if they differ on at most a single entry, and denote this
by X ∼ X ′. Informally, differential privacy requires that for every pair of datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n
that differ on at most a single entry, the distributions M(X) and M(X ′) are close. In our work
we consider a few different variants of differential privacy. The first is the standard variant of
differential privacy.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy (DP) [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy ((ε, δ)-DP) if for every pair of neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n,
∀Y ⊆ Y P[M(X) ∈ Y ] ≤ eεP[M(X ′) ∈ Y ]+ δ.
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The second variant is so-called concentrated differential privacy [DR16], specifically the refinement
zero-mean concentrated differential privacy [BS16].
Definition 2.2 (Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) [BS16]). A randomized algorithm
M : X n → Y satisfies ρ-zCDP if for every pair of neighboring datasets X,X ′ ∈ X n,
∀α ∈ (1,∞) Dα
(
M(X)||M(X ′)) ≤ ρα,
where Dα(M(X)||M(X ′)) is the α-Re´nyi divergence between M(X) and M(X ′).1
Both of these definitions are closed under post-processing
Lemma 2.3 (Post-Processing [DMNS06, BS16]). If M : X n → Y is (ε, δ)-DP and P : Y → Z
is any randomized function, then the algorithm P ◦M is (ε, δ)-DP. Similarly if M is ρ-zCDP
then the algorithm P ◦M is ρ-zCDP.
Qualitatively, DP with δ = 0 is stronger than zCDP, which is stronger than DP with δ > 0.
These are captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 (Relationships Between Variants of DP [BS16]). For every ε ≥ 0,
1. If M satisfies (ε, 0)-DP, then M is ε
2
2 -zCDP.
2. If M satisfies ε
2
2 -zCDP, then M satisfies (
ε2
2 + ε
√
2 log(1δ ), δ)-DP for every δ > 0.
Note that the parameters for DP and zCDP are on different scales, with (ε, δ)-DP roughly
commensurate with ε
2
2 -zCDP.
Composition. A crucial property of all of the variants of differential privacy is that can be com-
posed adaptively. By adaptive composition, we mean a sequence of algorithms M1(X), . . . ,MT (X)
where the algorithmMt(X) may also depend on the outcomes of the algorithmsM1(X), . . . ,Mt−1(X).
Lemma 2.5 (Composition of DP [DMNS06, DRV10, BS16]). If M is an adaptive composition
of differentially private algorithms M1, . . . ,MT , the the following all hold:
1. If M1, . . . ,MT are (ε1, δ1), . . . , (εT , δT )-DP then M is (ε, δ)-DP for
ε =
∑
t
εt and δ =
∑
t
δt
2. If M1, . . . ,MT are (ε0, δ1), . . . , (ε0, δT )-DP for some ε0 ≤ 1, then for every δ0 > 0, M is
(ε, δ)-DP for
ε = ε0
√
6T log(1/δ0) and δ = δ0 +
∑
t
δt
3. If M1, . . . ,MT are ρ1, . . . , ρT -zCDP then M is ρ-zCDP for ρ =
∑
t ρt.
Note that the first and third properties say that (ε, δ)-DP and ρ-zCDP compose linearly—
the parameters simply add up. The second property says that (ε, δ)-DP actually composes
sublinearly—the parameter ε grows roughly with the square root of the number of steps in the
composition, provided we allow a small increase in δ.
The Gaussian Mechanism. Our algorithms will extensively use the well known and standard
Gaussian mechanism to ensure differential privacy.
1Given two probability distributions P,Q over Ω, Dα(P‖Q) = 1α−1 log
(∑
x P (x)
αQ(x)1−α
)
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Definition 2.6 (`2-Sensitivity). Let f : X n → Rd be a function, its `2-sensitivity is
∆f = max
X∼X′∈Xn
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2
Lemma 2.7 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let f : X n → Rd be a function with `2-sensitivity ∆f .
Then the Gaussian mechanism
Mf (X) = f(X) +N
(
0,
(
∆f√
2ρ
)2
· I
)
satisfies ρ-zCDP.
In order to prove accuracy, we will use the following standard tail bounds for Gaussian random
variables.
Lemma 2.8. If Z ∼ N(0, σ2) then for every t > 0, P[|Z| > tσ] ≤ 2e−t2/2.
Parameter Estimation to Distribution Estimation In this work, our goal is to estimate
some underlying distribution in total variation distance. For both Gaussian and product
distributions, we will achieve this by estimating the parameters of the distribution, and we argue
that a distribution from the class with said parameters will be accurate in statistical distance.
For product distributions, we require an estimate of the parameters which is accurate in terms
of a type of chi-squared distance; this is shown in the proof of Theorem 5.2. For Gaussian
distributions, the parameter estimate we require is slightly more difficult to describe. For a vector
x, define ‖x‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2x‖2. Similarly, for a matrix X, define ‖X‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2XΣ−1/2‖F . With
these two norms in place, we have the following lemma, which is a combination of Corollaries
2.13 and 2.14 of [DKK+16].
Lemma 2.9. Let α ≥ 0 be smaller than some absolute constant. Suppose that ‖µ − µˆ‖Σ ≤ α,
and ‖Σ− Σˆ‖Σ ≤ α, where N (µ,Σ) is a Gaussian distribution in Rd, µˆ ∈ Rd, and Σ ∈ Rd×d is a
PSD matrix. Then dTV(N (µ,Σ),N (µˆ, Σˆ)) ≤ O(α).
3 Private Covariance Estimation for Gaussians
In this section we present the first of two algorithms for privately estimating the covariance
of an unknown Gaussian. The algorithm we present in this section will have a polylogarithmic
dependence on the condition number of the Gaussian, and in the next section we will show how
to eliminate this dependence entirely.
Suppose we are given i.i.d. samples X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (0,Σ) where I  Σ  κI. Our goal is to
privately output Σ̂ so that
‖Σ− Σ̂‖Σ ≤ O(α),
where ‖A‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2AΣ−1/2‖F . Here the matrix square root denotes any possible square root;
it is trivial to check that all such choices are equivalent. By Lemma 2.9), this condition ensures
dTV(N (0,Σ),N (0, Σ̂)) ≤ O(α).
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3.1 Useful Concentration Inequalities
We will need several facts about Gaussians and Gaussian matrices. Throughout this section,
let GUE(σ2) denote the distribution over d× d symmetric matrices M where for all i ≤ j, we
have Mij ∼ N (0, σ2) i.i.d.. From basic random matrix theory, we have the following guarantee.
Theorem 3.1 (see e.g. [Tao12] Corollary 2.3.6). For d sufficiently large, there exist absolute
constants C, c > 0 such that
P
M∼GUE(σ2)
[
‖M‖2 > Aσ
√
d
]
≤ C exp(−cAd)
for all A ≥ C.
We also require the following, well known tail bound on quadratic forms on Gaussians.
Theorem 3.2 (Hanson-Wright Inequality (see e.g. [LM00])). Let X ∼ N (0, I) and let A be a
d× d matrix. Then, for all t > 0, the following two bounds hold:
P
[
X>AX − tr(A) ≥ 2‖A‖F
√
t+ 2‖A‖2t
]
≤ exp(−t) (1)
P
[
X>AX − tr(A) ≤ −2‖A‖F
√
t
]
≤ exp(−t) (2)
As a special case of the above inequality, we also have
Fact 3.3 ([LM00]). Fix β > 0, and let X1, . . . , Xm ∼ N (0, σ2) be independent. Then
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
i=1
X2i − σ2
∣∣∣∣∣ > 4σ2
(√
log(1/β)
m
+
2 log(1/β)
m
)]
≤ β
3.2 Deterministic Regularity Conditions
We will rely on certain regularity properties of i.i.d. samples from a Gaussian. These are
standard concentration inequalities, and a reference for these facts is Section 4 of [DKK+16].
Fact 3.4. Let X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (0,Σ) i.i.d. for I  Σ  κI. Let Yi = Σ−1/2Xi and let
Σ̂Y =
1
n
n∑
i=1
YiY
>
i
Then for every β > 0, the following conditions hold except with probability 1−O(β).
∀i ∈ [n] ‖Yi‖22 ≤ O(d log(n/β)) (3)(
1−O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
))
· I  Σ̂Y 
(
1 +O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
))
· I (4)
∥∥∥I− Σ̂Y ∥∥∥
F
≤ O
(√
d2 + log(1/β)
n
)
(5)
We now note some simple consequences of these conditions. These inequalities follow from simple
linear algebra and we omit their proof for conciseness.
10
Lemma 3.5. Let Y1, . . . , Yn satisfy (3)–(5). Fix M  0, and for all i = 1, . . . , n, let Zi = M1/2Yi,
and let Σ̂Z =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ZiZ
>
i . Let κ
′ be the top eigenvalue of M . Then
∀i ∈ [n] ‖Zi‖22 ≤ O
(
κ′d log(n/β)
)(
1−O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
))
·M  Σ̂Z 
(
1 +O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
))
·M
∥∥∥M − Σ̂Z∥∥∥
M
≤ O
(√
d2 + log(1/β)
n
)
3.3 A Simple Algorithm for Well Conditioned Gaussians
We first consider the following simple algorithm: remove all points whose norm exceeds a certain
threshold, then compute the empirical covariance of the resulting data set, and perturb the
empirical covariance with noise to preserve privacy. This algorithm will have nearly-optimal
dependence on most parameters, however, it will have a polynomial dependence on the condition
number. Pseudocode for this algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Naive Private Gaussian Covariance Estimation NaivePCEρ,β,κ(X)
Input: A set of n samples X1, . . . , Xn from an unknown Gaussian. Parameters ρ, β, κ > 0
Output: A covariance matrix M .
Let S ← {i ∈ [n] : ‖Xi‖22 ≤ O(dκ log(n/β))}
Let
σ ← Θ
(
dκ log(nβ )
nρ1/2
)
Return M ← 1n
∑
i∈S XiX
>
i +N , where N ∼ GUE(σ2)
Lemma 3.6 (Analysis of NaivePCE). For every ρ, β, κ, n, NaivePCEρ,β,κ(X) satisfies ρ-
zCDP, and if X1, . . . , Xn are sampled i.i.d. from N (0,Σ) for I  Σ  κI and satisfy (3)–(5),
then with probability at least 1−O(β), it outputs M so that M = Σ1/2(I +N ′)Σ1/2 +N where
‖N ′‖F ≤ O
(√
d2 + log(1/β)
n
)
and ‖N‖Σ ≤ O
(
d2κ log(n/β) log(1/β)
nρ1/2
)
, and (6)
‖N ′‖2 ≤ O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
)
and ‖N‖2 ≤ O
(
d3/2κ log(n/β) log(n/β)
nρ1/2
)
. (7)
Proof. We first prove the privacy guarantee. Given two neighboring data sets X,X ′ of size n
which differ in that one contains Xi and the other contains X
′
i, the truncated empirical covariance
of these two data sets can change in Frobenius norm by at most∥∥∥∥ 1n(XiX>i −X ′i(X ′i)>)
∥∥∥∥
F
≤ 1
n
‖Xi‖22 +
1
n
‖X ′i‖22 ≤ O
(
dκ log(n/β)
n
)
.
Thus the privacy guarantee follows immediately from Lemma 2.7.
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By Fact 3.4, this occurs with probability at least 1−O(β). Since (3) holds, we have S = [n].
The first inequality in (6) now follows from Lemma 3.5, and the second follows from Fact 3.3
and since ‖N‖Σ ≤ ‖N‖F , as Σ  I. By a similar logic, (7) holds since we can apply Lemma 3.5
and Theorem 3.1.
The following is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.6, seen by noting that ‖Σ−M‖Σ =
‖Σ−1/2NΣ−1/2 −N ′‖F ≤ ‖N‖Σ + ‖N ′‖F .
Theorem 3.7. For every ρ, β, κ > 0, the algorithm NaivePCEρ,β,κ is ρ-zCDP and, when given
n = O
(
d2 + log( 1β )
α2
+
κd2polylog( κdαβρ)
αρ1/2
)
,
samples from N (0,Σ) satisfying I  Σ  κI, with probability at least 1−O(β), it returns M such
that ‖Σ−M‖Σ ≤ O(α).
3.4 A Private Recursive Preconditioner
When κ is a constant, Theorem 3.7 says that NaivePCE privately estimates the covariance of
a Gaussian with little overhead compared to non-private estimation. In this section we will show
how to nearly eliminate the dependence on the covariance by privately learning a preconditioner
A such that I  AΣA  1000I. Once we have this preconditioner, we can reduce the condition
number of the distribution to a constant. In this state, we can apply NaivePCE to estimate
the covariance at no cost in κ.
3.4.1 Reducing the Condition Number by a Constant
Our preconditioner works recursively. The main ingredient in the recursive construction
is an algorithm, WeakPPC (Algorithm 2) that privately estimates a matrix A such that the
condition number of AΣA> improves over that of Σ by a constant factor. Once we have this
primitive we can apply it recursively in a straightforward way. Note that in Algorithm 2, we apply
NaivePCE to obtain a weak estimate of Σ, we will be using too few samples for NaivePCE to
obtain a good estimate of Σ on its own.
Algorithm 2: Private Preconditioning WeakPPCρ,β,κ,K(X)
Input: A set of n samples X1, . . . , Xn from an unknown Gaussian. Parameters
ρ, β, κ,K > 0.
Output: A symmetric matrix A.
Let Z ← NaivePCEρ,β,κ(X1, . . . , Xn)
Let (λ1, v1), . . . , (λd, vd) be the eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors of Z
Let V ← span({vi : λi ≥ κ2}) ⊆ Rd
Return the pair (V,A) where
A =
1√
K
ΠV + ΠV ⊥
The guarantee of Algorithm 2 is captured in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.8. For every ρ, β, κ,K > 0, WeakPPCρ,β,κ,K(X) satisfies ρ-zCDP and, if X1, . . . , Xn
are sampled i.i.d. from N (0,Σ) for I  Σ  κI and satisfy (3)–(5), then with probability at least
1−O(β) it outputs (V,A) such that
(1− ψ)2(1− Γ)I  AΣA  (1 + ψ) · κ
(
max
(
1
K
,
1
2
)
+ ϕ
)
I (8)
where
ϕ = O
(
d3/2 log(n/β) log(1/β)
nρ1/2
)
, ψ = O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
n
)
and Γ = max
(
2K
(1/2− ϕ)κ,
16Kϕ2
(1/2− ϕ)2
)
.
In particular, if κ > 1000, K = O(1), and
n ≥ O
(
d3/2polylog( dρβ )
ρ1/2
)
then A is such that 0.99I  AΣA  0.55κI, which implies I  (1.1A)Σ(1.1A)  0.7κI.
Proof. Privacy follows since we are simply post-processing the output of Algorithm 1 (Lemma 2.3).
Thus it suffices to prove correctness. We assume that (3)–(5) hold simultaneously. By Lemma 3.6,
(6)–(7) hold simultaneously for the matrix Z except with probability O(β). We will condition
on these events throughout the remainder of the proof. Observe that (4) implies that Σ̂ =
1
n
∑n
i=1XiX
>
i is non-singular.
We will prove the upper bound and lower bound in (8) in two separate lemmata.
Lemma 3.9. Let V,A be as in Algorithm 2. Then, conditioned on (3)–(7), with probability
1−O(β), we have
‖AΣA‖2 ≤ (1 + ψ) · κ
(
max
(
1
K
,
1
2
)
+ ϕ
)
.
Lemma 3.10. Let V,A be as in Algorithm 2. Then, conditioned on (3)–(7), with probability
1−O(β), we have
AΣA  (1− ψ)2(1− Γ)I . (9)
These two lemmata therefore together imply Theorem 3.8. We now turn our attention to the
proofs of these lemmata. Let N be the Gaussian noise added to the empirical covariance in
NaivePCE, so that Z = Σ̂ +N .
Proof of Lemma 3.9. By Lemma 3.5 (with M = Σ), it suffices to show that
‖AΣ̂A‖2 ≤ κ
(
max
(
1
K
,
1
2
)
+ ϕ
)
.
But with probability 1− β, we have∥∥∥AΣ̂A∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖AZA‖2 + ‖ANA‖2
(a)
≤ ‖AZA‖2 + κϕ ,
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where (a) follows since ‖A‖2 ≤ 1 and Theorem 3.1. We now observe that since V is a span of
eigenvectors of Z, we have
AZA =
1
K
ΠV ZΠV + ΠV ⊥ZΠV ⊥ ,
and so by our choice of V , we have ‖AZA‖2 ≤ κ ·max(1/K, 1/2). This completes our proof.
We now prove the lower bound in Theorem 3.8:
Proof of Lemma 3.10. As before, by Lemma 3.5, it suffices to prove that
AΣ̂A  (1− ψ)(1− Γ)I .
This is equivalent to showing that for all unit vectors u, we have
uTAΣ̂Au ≥ (1− ψ)(1− Γ) .
Fix any such u. Expanding, we have
uTAΣ̂Au =
1
K
uTΠV Σ̂ΠV u+
1
K1/2
uTΠV Σ̂ΠV ⊥u+
1
K1/2
uTΠV ⊥Σ̂ΠV u+ u
TΠV ⊥Σ̂ΠV ⊥u . (10)
The first and last terms are non-negative since Σ̂ is PSD, but the other terms may be negative,
so we need to control their magnitude. Note that
uTΠV Σ̂ΠV u = u
TΠV ZΠV u− uTΠVNΠV u
≥ κ
2
‖ΠV u‖22 − κϕ‖ΠV u‖22 = κ
(
1
2
− ϕ
)
‖ΠV u‖22 .
where the inequality follows from our choice of V (the “large” directions of Z), and Theorem 3.1
(bounding the spectral norm of N). On the other hand, we have∣∣∣∣ 1K1/2uTΠV Σ̂ΠV ⊥u
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ 1K1/2uTΠV (Z +N)ΠV ⊥u
∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
∣∣∣∣ 1K1/2uTΠVNΠV ⊥u
∣∣∣∣
(b)
≤ κ
K1/2
ϕ‖ΠV u‖2‖ΠV ⊥u‖2
≤ κ
K1/2
ϕ‖ΠV u‖2 ,
where (a) follows since ΠV ZΠV ⊥ = 0, and (b) follows from Theorem 3.1. Similarly, we have∣∣∣∣ 1K1/2uTΠV ⊥Σ̂ΠV u
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κK1/2ϕ‖ΠV u‖2 .
Thus, if we have ‖ΠV u‖22 ≥ Γ, by our choice of Γ, we have
1
K
uTΠV Σ̂ΠV u+
1
K1/2
uTΠV Σ̂ΠV ⊥u+
1
K1/2
uTΠV ⊥Σ̂ΠV u ≥
κ
K
(
1
2
− ϕ
)
‖ΠV u‖22 − 2
κ
K1/2
ϕ‖ΠV u‖2
≥ κ
2K
(
1
2
− ϕ
)
‖ΠV u‖22
≥ 1 .
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Thus in this case the claim follows since the final term in (10) is nonnegative since Σ̂ is PSD.
Now consider the case where
‖ΠV u‖2 < Γ ,
or equivalently, since by the Pythagorean theorem we have ‖ΠV u‖22 + ‖ΠV ⊥u‖22 = 1,
‖ΠV ⊥u‖22 > 1− Γ .
Then, since we have Σ̂  (1− ψ)I (Fact 3.4), we have
uTAΣ̂Au ≥ (1− ψ)uT
(
1
K
ΠV ΠV + ΠV ⊥ΠV ⊥
)
u
≥ (1− ψ)‖ΠV ⊥u‖22
≥ (1− ψ)(1− Γ) ,
as claimed.
Combining Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 yield the desired conclusion.
3.4.2 Recursive Preconditioning
Once we have WeakPPC, we can apply it recursively to obtain a private preconditioner,
PPC (Algorithm 3) that reduces the condition number down to a constant.
Algorithm 3: Privately estimating covariance PPCρ,β,κ(X)
Input: A set of n samples X1, . . . , Xn from an unknown Gaussian N (0,Σ). Parameters
ρ, β, κ > 0
Output: A symmetric matrix A
Let T ← O(log κ) ρ′ ← ρ/T β′ ← β/T
Let κ(1) ← κ and let X(1)i ← Xi for i = 1, . . . , n.
For t = 1, . . . , T
Let A˜(t) ←WeakPPCρ′,β′,κ(t),κ(t)(X(t)1 , . . . , X(t)n ), and let A(t) ← 1.1A˜(t).
Let κ(t+1) ← 0.7κ(t)
Let X
(t+1)
i ← A(t)X(t)i for i = 1, . . . , n.
Return The matrix A =
∏T
t=1A
(t).
Theorem 3.11. For every ρ, α, β, κ > 0, PPCρ,β,κ satisfies ρ-zCDP, and when given
n = Ω
(
d3/2 log1/2(κ)polylog(d log κρβ )
ρ1/2
)
samples X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (0,Σ) for I  Σ  κI, with probability 1−O(β) it outputs a symmetric
matrix A such that I  AΣA  1000I.
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Proof. Privacy is immediate from Theorem 3.8 and composition of ρ-zCDP (Lemma 2.5).
By Fact 3.4, (3)–(5) hold for the sample X1, . . . , Xn except with probability O(β). Define
Σ(1) = Σ and recursively define Σ(t) = A(t−1)Σ(t−1)A(t−1) to be the covariance after the t-th
round of preconditioning. By the guarantee of WeakPPC (Theorem 3.8), a union bound, and
our choice of n, we have that for every t, we obtain a matrix A(t) such that
I  A(t)Σ(t)A(t)  0.7κI.
The theorem now follows by induction on t.
3.5 Putting It All Together
We can now combine our private preconditioning algorithm with the na¨ıve algorithm for
covariance estimation to obtain a complete algorithm for covariance estimation.
Algorithm 4: Private Covariance Estimator PGCEρ,β,κ(X)
Input: Samples X1, . . . , Xn from an unknown Gaussian N (0,Σ). Parameters ρ, β, κ > 0.
Output: A matrix Σ̂ such that ‖Σ− Σ̂‖Σ ≤ α.
Let ρ′ ← ρ/2 and β′ ← β/2
Let A← PPCρ′,β′,κ(X1, . . . , Xn) be the private preconditioner
Let Yi ← AXi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let Σ˜← NaivePCEρ′,β′,1000(Y1, . . . , Yn)
Return Σ̂ = A−1Σ˜A−1
This algorithm has the following guarantee.
Theorem 3.12. For every ρ, β, κ > 0, PGCEρ.β,κ(X) is ρ-zCDP and, when given
n = O
(
d2 + log( 1β )
α2
+
d2polylog( dαβρ)
αρ1/2
+
d3/2 log1/2(κ)polylog(d log κρβ )
ρ1/2
)
X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (0,Σ) for I  Σ  κI, with probability 1 − O(β), it outputs Σ̂ such that
‖Σ− Σ̂‖Σ ≤ O(α).
Proof. Privacy follows from Theorem 3.8 and composition of ρ-zCDP (Lemma 2.5).
By construction, the samples Y1, . . . , Yn are i.i.d. from N (0, AΣA). By Theorem 3.11, and
our choice of n, we have that except with probability O(β), A is such that I  AΣAT  1000I.
Therefore, combining the guarantees of NaivePCE with our choice of n we obtain that, except
with probability O(β), Σ˜ satisfies ‖AΣA− Σ˜‖AΣA ≤ O(α). The theorem now follows because
‖Σ− Σ̂‖Σ = ‖Σ−A−1Σ˜A−1‖Σ = ‖AΣA− Σ˜‖AΣA ≤ O(α).
4 Private Mean Estimation for Gaussians
Suppose we are given i.i.d. samples X1, . . . , Xn where Xi ∼ N (µ,Σ) where ‖µ‖2 ≤ R is an
unknown mean and I  Σ  κI is an unknown covariance matrix. Our goal is to privately learn
m such that
‖µ− µ̂‖Σ ≤ O(α)
16
where ‖v‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2v‖2 is the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the covariance Σ. This
guarantee ensures
dTV(N (µ,Σ),N (µ̂,Σ)) = O(α).
When κ is a constant, we can obtain such a guarantee in a relatively straightforward
way by applying the mean-estimation procedure for univariate Gaussians due to Karwa and
Vadhan [KV18] to each coordinate. To handle large values of κ, we combine their procedure with
our procedure for privately learning a strong approximation to the covariance matrix.
4.1 Mean Estimation for Well-Conditioned Gaussians
We start with the following algorithm for learning the mean of a univariate Gaussian.
Theorem 4.1 ([KV18]). For every ε, δ, α, β,R, σ > 0, there is an (ε, 0)-DP algorithm KVMeanε,α,β,R,κ(X)
and an
n = O
(
log( 1β )
α2
+
log( logRαβε )
αε
+
log(Rβ )
ε
)
such that if X = (X1, . . . , Xn) are i.i.d. samples from N (µ, σ2) for |µ| ≤ R and 1 ≤ σ2 ≤ κ then,
with probability at least 1− β, KVMean outputs µ̂ such that |µ− µ̂| ≤ ακ. This algorithm also
satisfies ρ-zCDP for ρ = ε
2
2 in which case we denote the algorithm KVMeanρ,α,β,R,κ(X).
Note that the algorithm only needs an upper bound κ on the true variance σ2 as a parameter.
However, since the error guarantees that depend on this upper bound, the upper bound needs to
be reasonably tight in order to get a useful estimate of the mean.
We will describe our na¨ıve algorithm for the case of ρ-zCDP since the parameters are cleaner.
We could also obtain an (ε, δ)-DP version using the (ε, δ)-DP version of NaivePME and setting
parameters appropriately.
Algorithm 5: Na¨ıve Private Mean Estimator NaivePMEρ,α,β,R,κ(X)
Input: Samples X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Rd from a d-variate Gaussian. Parameters ρ, α, β,R, κ > 0.
Output: A vector µ̂ such that ‖µ− µ̂‖Σ ≤ α.
Let ρ′ ← ρ/d α′ ← α/κ√d β′ ← β/d
For j = 1, . . . , d
Let µ̂j ← KVMeanρ′,α′,β′,R,κ(X1,j , . . . , Xn,j)
Return µ̂ = (µ̂1, . . . , µ̂d)
Theorem 4.2. For every ρ, α, β,R, κ > 0, the algorithm NaivePMEρ,α,β,R,κ is ρ-zCDP and
there is an
n = O
(
κ2d log( dβ )
α2
+
κd log(κd logRαβρ )
αρ1/2
+
√
d log(Rdβ )
ρ1/2
)
such that if X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (µ,Σ) for ‖µ‖2 ≤ R and I  Σ  κI then, with probability at least
1− β, NaivePME outputs µ̂ such that ‖µ− µ̂‖Σ ≤ α.
Proof. The fact that the algorithm satisfies ρ-zCDP follows immediately from the assumed
privacy of KVMean and the composition property for zCDP (Lemma 2.5).
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Next we argue that with probability at least 1− β, for every coordinate j = 1, . . . , d, we have
|µj−µ̂j | ≤ α/
√
d. Observe that, since X1, . . . , Xn are distributed as N (µ,Σ), the j-th coordinates
X1,j , . . . , Xn,j are distributed as N (µj ,Σjj) and, by assumption |µj | ≤ R and 1 ≤ Σjj ≤ κ. Thus,
by Theorem 4.1, we have |µj − µ̂j | ≤ α′κ = α/
√
d except with probability at most β′ = β/d.
The statement now follows by a union bound.
Assuming that every coordinate-wise estimate is correct up to α/
√
d, we have
‖µ− µ̂‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2(µ− µ̂)‖2 ≤ ‖Σ−1/2‖2 · ‖µ− µ̂‖2 ≤ α
where the final equality uses the coordinate-wise bound on µ− µ̂ and the fact that I  Σ. To
complete the proof, we can plug our choices of ρ′, α′, β′ into the sample complexity bound for
KVMean from Theorem 4.1.
The proof and algorithm for the final statement of the theorem regarding (ε, δ)-DP are
completely analogous. This completes the proof of the theorem.
4.2 An Algorithm for General Gaussians
If Σ were known, then we could easily perform mean estimation without dependence on κ
simply by applying Σ−1/2 to each sample and running NaivePME. Specifically, if Xi ∼ N (µ,Σ)
then Σ−1/2Xi ∼ N (Σ−1/2µ, I). Then applying NaivePME we would obtain µ̂ such that
‖µ− µ̂‖Σ = ‖Σ−1/2(µ− µ̂)‖2 ≤ α and the sample complexity would be independent of κ. Using
the covariance estimation procedure from the previous section, we can obtain a good enough
approximation to Σ−1/2 to carry out this reduction.
Algorithm 6: Private Mean Estimator PMEρ,α,β,R,κ(X)
Input: Samples X1, . . . , X3n ∈ Rd from a d-variate Gaussian N (µ,Σ) with unknown mean
and covariance. Parameters ρ, α, β,R, κ > 0.
Output: A vector µ̂ such that ‖µ− µ̂‖Σ ≤ α.
For i = 1, . . . , n, let Zi =
1√
2
(X2i −X2i−1)
Let A← PPCρ,β,κ(Z1, . . . , Zn)
For i = 1, . . . , n, let Yi = AX2n+i
Let µ˜← NaivePMEρ,α,β,1000R,1000(Y1, . . . , Yn)
Return µ̂← A−1µ˜
We capture the properties of PME in the following theorem
Theorem 4.3. For every ρ, α, β,R, κ > 0, the algorithm PMEρ,α,β,R,κ is 2ρ-zCDP and there is
an
n = O
(
d log( dβ )
α2
+
d log(d logRαβρ )
αρ1/2
+
√
d log(Rdβ )
ρ1/2
+ nPPC
)
such that if X1, . . . , Xn ∼ N (µ,Σ) for ‖µ‖2 ≤ R and I  Σ  κI then, with probability at least
1 − 2β, PME outputs µ̂ such that ‖µ − µ̂‖Σ ≤ α. In the above nPPC is the sample complexity
required by PPCρ,β,κ (Theorem 3.11).
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Proof. Privacy will follow immediately from the composition property of 2ρ-zCDP and the
assumed privacy of PPC and NaivePME. The sample complexity bound will also follow
immediately from the sample complexity bounds for PCE and NaivePME. Thus, we focus on
proving that ‖µ− µ̂‖Σ ≤ α.
Since X1, . . . , X2n are i.i.d. from N (µ,Σ), the values Z1, . . . , Zn are i.i.d. from N (0,Σ).
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − β, PPC(Z1, . . . , Zn) returns a matrix A such that
I  AΣA  1000I. Note that since I  Σ and AΣA  1000 we have ‖A‖2 ≤ 1000.
Now, since the samples X2n+1, . . . , X3n are i.i.d. from N (µ,Σ), the values Y1, . . . , Yn are i.i.d.
from N (Aµ,AΣA). Note that ‖Aµ‖2 ≤ ‖A‖2‖µ‖2 ≤ 1000R and, by assumption, I  AΣA 
1000I. When we apply NaivePMEρ,α,β,1000R,1000 to Y1, . . . , Yn, with probability at least 1− β
we will obtain µ˜ such that ‖Aµ− µ˜‖AΣA ≤ α. Finally, we can write ‖µ− µ̂‖Σ = ‖Aµ−Aµ̂‖AΣA =
‖Aµ − µ˜‖AΣA ≤ α. The theorem now follows by a union bound over the two possible failure
events.
5 Privately Learning Product Distributions
In this section we introduce and analyze our algorithm for learning a product distribution
P over {0, 1}d in total variation distance, thereby proving Theorem 1.3 in the introduction.
The pseudocode appears in Algorithm 7. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that the
product distribution has mean that is bounded coordinate-wise by 12 (i.e. E[P ]  12), although
we emphasize that this assumption is essentially without loss of generality, and can easily be
removed while paying only a constant factor in the sample complexity.
5.1 A Private Product-Distribution Estimator
To describe the algorithm, we need to introduce notation for the truncated mean. Given a
dataset element (a vector) Xi ∈ {0, 1}d and B ≥ 0, we use
truncB(Xi) =
{
Xi if ‖Xi‖2 ≤ B
B
‖Xi‖2 ·Xi if ‖Xi‖2 > B
to denote the truncation of x to an `2-ball of radius B. Given a dataset X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈
{0, 1}m×d and B > 0, we use
tmeanB(X) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
truncB(Xi)
to denote the mean of the truncated vectors. Observe that the `2-sensitivity of tmeanB is
B
m ,
while the `2-sensitivity of the untruncated mean is infinite. Note that tmeanB(X) =
1
m
∑m
i=1Xi
unless ‖Xi‖2 > B for some i. If one of the inputs to tmeanB does not satisfy the norm bound
then we will say, “truncation occurred,” as a shorthand.
We also use the following notational conventions: Given a dataset element Xi ∈ {0, 1}d, we will
use the array notation Xi[j] to refer to its j-th coordinate, and the notation Xi[S] = (Xi[j])j∈S
to refer to the vector X restricted to the subset of coordinates S ⊆ [d]. Given a dataset
X = (X1, . . . , Xm), we use the notation X[S] = (X1[S], . . . , Xm[S]) to refer to the dataset
consisting of each Xi restricted to the subset of coordinates S ⊆ [d].
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Algorithm 7: Private Product-Distribution Estimator PPDEρ,α,β(X)
Input: Samples X1, . . . , Xn ∈ {0, 1}d from an unknown product distribution P satisfying
E[P ]  12 . Parameters ρ, α, β > 0.
Output: A product distribution Q over {0, 1}d such that dTV(P,Q) ≤ α.
Set parameters:
R← log2(d/2) c← 128 log5/4(d/αβ(2ρ)1/2) c′ ← 128 log3(dR/β) m← c
′d
α2
+ cd
α(2ρ)1/2
Split X into R+ 1 blocks of m samples each, denoted Xr = (Xr1 , . . . , X
r
m)
(Halt and output ⊥ if n is too small.)
Let q[j]← 0 for every j ∈ [d], and let S1 = [d], u1 ← 12 , τ1 ← 316 , and r ← 1
// Partitioning Rounds
While ur|Sr| ≥ 1
Let Sr+1 ← ∅
Let Br ←
√
6ur|Sr| log(mR/β)
Let qr[Sr]←R tmeanBr(Xr[Sr]) +N
(
0, B
2
r
2ρm2
· I
)
For j ∈ Sr
If qr[j] < τr
Add j to Sr+1
Else
Set q[j]← qr[j]
Let ur+1 ← 12ur, τr+1 ← 12τr, and r ← r + 1
// Final Round
If |Sr| ≥ 1
Let Br ←
√
6 log(m/β)
Let q[Sr]←R tmeanBr(Xr[Sr]) +N
(
0, B
2
r
2ρm2
· I
)
Return Q = Ber(q[1])⊗ · · · ⊗ Ber(q[d])
5.2 Privacy Analysis
The privacy analysis of Algorithm 7 is straightforward, based on privacy of the Gaussian
mechanism and bounded sensitivity of the truncated mean.
Theorem 5.1. For every ρ, α, β > 0, PPDEρ,α,β(X) satisfies ρ-zCDP.
Proof. Since each individual’s data is used only to compute tmeanBr(X
r) for a single round
r, privacy follows immediately from Lemma 2.7 and from observing that the `2-sensitivity of
tmeanB is
B
n . Note that, since a disjoint set of samples X
r is used for each round r, each sample
only affects a single one of the rounds, so we do not need to apply composition.
5.3 Accuracy Analysis for PPDE
In this section we prove the following theorem bounding the sample complexity required by
PPDE to learn a product distribution up to α in total variation distance.
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Theorem 5.2. For every d ∈ N, every product distribution P over {0, 1}d, and every ρ, α, β > 0,
if X = (X1, . . . , Xn) are independent samples from P for
n = O˜
(
d
α2
+
d
α
√
ρ
)
,
then with probability at least 1−O(β), PPDEρ,α,β(X) outputs Q, such that dTV(P,Q) ≤ O(α).
The notation O˜(·) hides polylogarithmic factors in d, 1α , 1β , and 1ρ .
Before proving the theorem, we will introduce or recall a few useful tools and inequalities.
Distances Between Distributions. We use several notions of distance between distributions.
Definition 5.3. If P,Q are distributions, then
• the statistical distance is dTV(P,Q) = 12
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)|,
• the χ2-divergence is dχ2(P‖Q) =
∑
x
(P (x)−Q(x))2
Q(x) , and
• the KL-divergence is dKL(P‖Q) =
∑
x P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x) .
For product distributions P = P1⊗· · ·⊗Pk and Q = Q1⊗· · ·⊗Qk, the χ2 and dKL divergences
are additive, and the statistical distance is subadditive. Specifically,
Lemma 5.4. Let P = P1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pk and Q = Q1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qk be two product distributions. Then
• dTV(P,Q) ≤
∑d
j=1 dTV(Pj , Qj),
• dχ2(P‖Q) ≤
∑d
j=1 dχ2(Pj‖Qj), and
• dKL(P‖Q) =
∑d
j=1 dKL(Pj‖Qj).
The three definitions also satisfy some useful relationships.
Lemma 5.5. For any two distributions P,Q we have 2 · dTV(P,Q)2 ≤ dKL(P‖Q) ≤ dχ2(P‖Q).
Tail Bounds. We need a couple of useful tail bounds for sums of independent Bernoulli random
variables. The first lemma is a useful form of the Chernoff bound.
Lemma 5.6. For every p > 0, if X1, . . . , Xm are i.i.d. samples from Ber(p) then for every ε > 0
P
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi ≥ p+ ε
]
≤ e−dKL(p+ε||p)·m and P
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
Xi ≤ p− ε
]
≤ e−dKL(p−ε||p)·m
The next lemma follows easily from a Chernoff bound.
Lemma 5.7. Suppose X1, . . . , Xk are sampled i.i.d. from a product distribution P over {0, 1}t,
where the mean of each coordinate is upper bounded by p (i.e. E[P ]  p). Then
1. if pt > 1, then for each i, P
[
‖Xi‖22 ≥ pt
(
1 + 3 log( kβ )
)]
≤ βk , and
2. if pt ≤ 1, then for each i, P
[
‖Xi‖22 ≥ 6 log( kβ )
]
≤ βk .
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5.3.1 Analysis of the Partitioning Rounds
In this section we analyze the progress made during the partitioning rounds. We show two
properties: (1) any coordinate j such that q[j] was set during the partitioning rounds has small
error and (2) any coordinate j such that q[j] was not set in the partitioning rounds has a small
mean. We capture the properties of the partitioning rounds that will be necessary for the proof
of Theorem 5.2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. If X1, . . . , XR each contain at least
m =
128d log3(dR/β)
α2
+
128d log5/4(d/αβ(2ρ)1/2)
αρ1/2
i.i.d. samples from P , then, with probability at least 1 − O(β), in every partitioning round
r = 1, . . . , R:
1. If a coordinate j does not go to the next round (i.e. j ∈ Sr but j 6∈ Sr+1) then q[j] has
small χ2-divergence with p[j],
4(p[j]− q[j])2
q[j]
≤ α
2
d
.
Thus, if SA consists of all coordinates such that q[j] is set in one of the partitioning rounds,
dTV(P [SA], Q[SA]) ≤ α.
2. If a coordinate j does go to the next round (i.e. j ∈ Sr, Sr+1), then p[j] is small,
p[j] ≤ ur+1 = ur
2
.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on r (taking a union bound over the events that
one of the two conditions fails in a given round r). Therefore, we will assume that in every round
r, p[j] ≤ ur for every j ∈ Sr and prove that if this bound holds then the two conditions in the
lemma hold. For the base of the induction, observe that, by assumption, p[j] ≤ u1 = 12 for every
j ∈ S1 = [d]. In what follows we fix an arbitrary round r ∈ [R]. Throughout the proof, we will
use the notation p˜r =
1
m
∑m
i=1X
r
i to denote the empirical mean of the r-th block of samples.
Claim 5.9. If p˜r[j] =
1
m
∑m
i=1X
r
i [j] and pj >
1
d , then with probability at least 1− 2βR ,
∀j ∈ Sr |p[j]− p˜r[j]| ≤
√√√√4p[j] log(dRβ )
m
Proof of Claim 5.9. We use a Chernoff Bound (Theorem 5.6), and facts that
∀γ > 0 dKL(p+ γ||p) ≥ γ
2
2(p+ γ)
and dKL(p− γ||p) ≥ γ
2
2p
,
and set
γ =
√√√√4p[j] log(dRβ )
m
.
Note that when p[j] > 1d , due to our choice of parameters, γ ≤ p[j]. Therefore, 2(p[j] +γ) ≤ 4p[j].
Finally, taking a union bound over the cases when p˜r[j] ≤ p[j]− γ and when p˜r[j] ≥ p[j] + γ, we
prove the claim.
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Claim 5.10. With probability at least 1 − βR , for every Xri ∈ Xr, ‖Xri ‖2 ≤ Br, so no rows of
Xr are truncated in the computation of tmeanBr(X
r).
Proof of Claim 5.10. By assumption, all marginals specified by Sr are upper bounded by ur.
Now, the expected value of ‖Xri ‖22 is at most ur|Sr|. Since Br =
√
ur|Sr|6 log(mR/β), we know
that Br ≥
√
ur|Sr|(1 + 3 log(mR/β)). The claim now follows from a Chernoff Bound (Lemma
5.7) and a union bound over the entries of Xr.
Claim 5.11. With probability at least 1− 2βR ,
∀j ∈ Sr |p˜r[j]− qr[j]| ≤
√√√√6ur|Sr| log(mRβ ) log(2dRβ )
ρm2
Proof of Claim 5.11. We assume that all marginals specified by Sr are upper bounded by ur.
From Claim 5.10, we know that, with probability at least 1− β/R, there is no truncation, so
tmeanBr(X
r[Sr]) =
1
m
∑
Xri ∈Xr X
r[Sr] = p˜r[Sr]. So, the Gaussian noise is added to p˜r[j] for each
j ∈ Sr. Therefore, the only source of error here is the Gaussian noise. Using the standard tail
bound for zero-mean Gaussians (Lemma 2.8), with the following parameters,
σ =
√√√√3ur|Sr| log(mRβ )
ρm2
and t =
√
2 log
(
2dR
β
)
,
and taking a union bound over all coordinates in Sr, and the event of truncation, we obtain the
claim.
Plugging our choice of m into Claims 5.9 and 5.11, applying the triangle inequality, and
simplifying, we get that (with high probability),
|p[j]− qr[j]| ≤ α
log1/4
(
d
β
)√ur
d
.
To simplify our calculations, we will define
er =
α
log1/4
(
d
β
)√ur
d
to denote the above bound on |p[j]− q[j]| in round r.
Claim 5.12. For all j ∈ Sr, with probability, at least, 1− 4βR ,
χ2(p[j], qr[j]) ≤ 4(p[j]− qr[j])
2
qr[j]
.
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Proof. For every r, and d more than some absolute constant, |er| ≤ 14 ,. Also, by assumption,
p[j] ≤ 12 , for all j ∈ [d]. Therefore, for every r, and every j ∈ Sr,
χ2(p[j], qr[j]) =
(p[j]− qr[j])2
qr[j]
+
(p[j]− qr[j])2
1− qr[j]
=
(p[j]− qr[j])2
qr[j](1− qr[j])
≤ 4(p[j]− qr[j])
2
qr[j]
Claim 5.13. With probability at least 1− 4βR , for every j ∈ Sr,
qr[j] ≥ τr =⇒ 4(p[j]− q[j])
2
q[j]
≤ α
2
d
.
Proof of Claim 5.13. We want to show the following inequality.
4(pj − qr[j])2
qr[j]
≤ α
2
d
We know that |pj − qr[j]| ≤ er with high probability. Thus, we need to show that if qr[j] ≥ τr,
the following inequality holds:
4e2r
qr[j]
≤ α
2
d
⇐⇒ 4de
2
r
α2
≤ qr[j].
We now show that the left-hand side is at most τr, which completes the proof. In the algorithm,
we have τr =
3
4ur+1:
4de2r
α2
≤ 3
4
ur+1 ⇐⇒ 4ur
log1/2
(
d
β
) ≤ 3
4
ur+1 ⇐⇒ 16
3 log1/2
(
d
β
) ≤ 1
2
.
Note that the final inequality is satisfied as long as d is larger than some absolute constant.
Claim 5.14. With probability at least 1− 4βR , for every j ∈ Sr,
qr[j] < τr =⇒ p[j] ≤ ur+1 = ur
2
.
Proof of Claim 5.14. We know that with high probability, pj ≤ qr[j] + er. But since qr[j] < τi,
we know that pj < τr + er. Also, τr =
3
4ur+1. Then it is sufficient to show the following.
er ≤ ur+1
4
⇐⇒ α
log1/4
(
d
β
)√ur
d
≤ ur+1
4
⇐⇒ 16α
2
du1 log
1/2
(
d
β
) ≤ (1
2
)r+1
⇐⇒
 16α2
du1 log
1/2
(
d
β
)
 1r+1 ≤ 1
2
. (11)
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Now we have 16α2
du1 log
1/2
(
d
β
)
 1r+1 = (1
d
) 1
r+1
·
 16α2
u1 log
1/2
(
d
β
)
 1r+1
≤ 1
2
·
 16α2
u1 log
1/2
(
d
β
)
 1r+1 (r ≤ R = log2(d/2))
≤ 1
2
where the last inequality holds for d larger than some absolute constant. Therefore, (11) is
satisfied for all 1 ≤ r ≤ R.
Claim 5.14 completes the inductive step of the proof. It establishes that at the beginning
of round r + 1, pj < ur+1 for all j ∈ Sr+1. Now we can take a union bound over all the failure
events in each round and over each of the R rounds so that the conclusions of the Lemma hold
with probability 1−O(β). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.8.
5.3.2 Analysis of the Final Round
In this section we show that the error of the coordinates j such that q[j] was set in the final
round r is small.
Lemma 5.15. Let r be the final round for which ur|Sr| ≤ 1. If p[j] ≤ ur for every j ∈ Sr, and
Xr contains at least
m =
128d log3(dR/β)
α2
+
128d log5/4(d/αβ(2ρ)1/2)
αρ1/2
i.i.d. samples from P , then with probability at least 1−O(β), then dTV(P [Sr], Q[Sr]) ≤ O(α)
Proof. Again, we use the notation, p˜r =
1
m
∑m
i=1X
r
i , for the rest of this proof. First we have,
two claims that bound the difference between p[j] and p˜[j].
Claim 5.16. For each j ∈ Sr, such that pj > 1d , with probability at least 1− 2β/d, we have,
∀j ∈ Sr |p[j]− p˜r[j]| ≤
√√√√4p[j] log( dβ)
m
Proof of Claim 5.16. The proof is identical to that of Claim 5.9.
Claim 5.17. For each j ∈ Sr, such that pj ≤ 1d , with probability at least 1− 4β/d, we have,
∀j ∈ Sr |p[j]− p˜r[j]| ≤ α
4d log
(
d
β
)
Proof of Claim 5.17. We use a Chernoff Bound (Theorem 5.6), and facts that
∀γ > 0 dKL(p+ γ||p) ≥ γ
2
2(p+ γ)
and dKL(p− γ||p) ≥ γ
2
2p
.
There are two cases to analyze.
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• pj > α2
16d ln2
(
dR
β
) : In this case, setting γ =
√
4p[j] log
(
d
β
)
m , we get γ ≤ p[j]. Then we apply
Theorem 5.6 with appropriate parameters.
• pj ≤ α2
16d ln2
(
dR
β
) : In this case, setting γ = 4 log
(
d
β
)
m , we get γ ≥ p[j]. Then we apply Theorem
5.6 with the corresponding parameters.
Since p[j] ≤ 1d , if m satisfies the assumption of the lemma, then
max

√√√√4p[j] log( dβ)
m
,
4 log
(
d
β
)
m
 ≤
α
4d log
(
d
β
) .
Therefore, with high probability, the maximum error is α
4d log
(
d
β
) .
Claim 5.18. With probability at least 1− β, for every Xri ∈ Xr, ‖Xri ‖2 ≤ Br, so no rows of Xr
are truncated in the computation of tmeanBr(X
r).
Proof of Claim 5.18. We assume that all marginals specified by Sr are upper bounded by ur.
Now, the expected value of ‖Xri ‖22 is upper bounded by 1. Also, Br =
√
6 log(m/β). With this,
we use a Chernoff Bound (Fact 5.7) and get the required result.
Claim 5.19. With probability at least 1− 2β,
∀j ∈ Sr |p˜[j]− qr[j]| ≤
√√√√6 log(mβ ) log(2dβ )
ρm2
Proof of Claim 5.19. We assume that all marginals specified by Sr are upper bounded by ur.
From Claim 5.18, we know that with high probability, there is no truncation, so, the Gaussian
noise is added to p˜j for each j ∈ Sr. Therefore, the only source of error here is the Gaussian
noise. Using the standard tail bound for zero-mean Gaussians (Lemma 2.8), with the following
parameters,
σ =
√√√√3 log(mβ )
ρm2
and t =
√
2 log
(
2d
β
)
,
and taking the union bound over all columns of the dataset in that round and the event of
truncation, we obtain the claim.
By the above claim, the magnitude of Gaussian noise added to each coordinate in the final
round is less than,
α
2d log1/4
(
d/αβ
√
2ρ
) .
We partition the set Sr into Sr,L =
{
j ∈ Sr : p[j] ≤ 1d
}
and Sr,H =
{
j ∈ Sr : p[j] > 1d
}
.
Claim 5.20. dTV(P [Sr,H ], Q[Sr,H ]) ≤ α
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Proof of Claim 5.20. For every coordinate j ∈ Sr,H , due Claim 5.16, and from the upper bound
on the Gaussian noise added, we know that,
|p[j]− q[j]| ≤ α
log1/4
(
d
β
)√p[j]
d
= er,H .
Now, we know that p[j] > 1d , and er,H ≤ p[j]2 , when d is greater than some absolute constant. So,
we can bound the χ2-divergence between such p[j] and q[j] by,
4(p[j]− q[j])2
q[j]
≤ 4e
2
r,H
p[j]− er,H
≤ 8α
2
d log1/2
(
d
β
)
≤ α
2
d
.
Thus, we have dχ2(P [Sr,H ]‖Q[Sr,H ]) ≤ α2, which implies dTV(P [Sr,H ], Q[Sr,H ]) ≤ α.
Claim 5.21. dTV(P [Sr,L], Q[Sr,L]) ≤ α
Proof of Claim 5.21. By Claim 5.17, and from the upper bound on the Gaussian noise added,
for every coordinate j ∈ Sr,L, we have,
|p[j]− q[j]| ≤ 2 ·max
 α4d log( dβ) ,
α
2d log1/4
(
d/αβ
√
2ρ
)

≤ α
d log1/4(d/β)
.
Thus, by Lemma 5.4, we have dTV(P [Sr,L], Q[Sr,L]) ≤ α.
Now, combining Claims 5.20 and 5.21, and applying Lemma 5.4 completes the proof.
5.3.3 Putting it Together
In this section we combine Lemmas 5.8 and 5.15 to prove Theorem 5.2. First, by Lemma 5.8,
with probability at least 1−O(β), if SA is the set of coordinates j such that q[j] was set in any
of the partitioning rounds, then
1. dTV(P [SA], Q[SA]) ≤ O(α) and
2. if j 6∈ SA and r is the final round, then p[j] ≤ ur.
Next, by the second condition, we can apply Lemma 5.15 to obtain that if SF consists of all
coordinates set in the final round, then with probability at least 1−O(β), dTV(P [SF ], Q[SF ]) ≤
O(α). Finally, we use a union bound and Lemma 5.4 to conclude that, with probability at least
1−O(β),
dTV(P,Q) ≤ dTV(P [SA], Q[SA]) + dTV(P [SF ], Q[SF ]) = O(α).
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
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6 Lower Bounds for Private Distribution Estimation
In this section we prove a number of lower bounds for private distribution estimation, matching
our upper bounds up to polylogarithmic factors. For estimating the mean of product or Gaussian
distributions, we prove lower bounds for the weaker notion of (ε, δ)-differential privacy, but still
show that they nearly match our upper bounds which are under the stronger notion of ε
2
2 -zCDP.
For estimating the covariance of Gaussian distributions, our lower bound is for ε-DP, a stronger
notion than our upper bound, which is ε
2
2 -zCDP. Proving lower bounds for covariance estimation
with stronger privacy (i.e., concentrated or approximate differential privacy) is an interesting
open question.
Our proofs generally consist of two parts. First, we prove a lower bound on the sample
complexity required for private parameter estimation. For our lower bounds on mean estimation,
we use modifications of the “fingerprinting” method. Then, we show that if two distributions are
distance in parameter distance (either `2-distance between their means, or Frobenius distance
between their covariances), then they will be far in statistical distance. Though we consider
questions of the latter sort to be very natural, we were surprised to find they have not been
studied as sigificantly as we expected. For example, while a lower bound on the statistical
distance between Gaussian distributions in terms of the `2-distance between their means is
folklore, a bound in terms of the Frobenius distance between their covariance matrices is fairly
recent [DMR18]. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our lower bound on the statistical
distance between binary product distributions in terms of the `2-distance between their means is
entirely novel.
In Section 6.1, we describe our lower bounds for learning product distributions. In Section 6.2,
we describe our lower bounds for learning Gaussian distributions with known covariance. Finally,
in Section 6.3, we describe our lower bounds for learning the covariance of Gaussian distributions.
6.1 Privately Learning Product Distributions
In this section we prove that our algorithm for learning product distributions has optimal
sample complexity up to polylogarithmic factors. Our proof actually shows that our algorithm is
optimal even if we only require the learner to work for somewhat balanced product distributions
(i.e. those whose marginals are bounded away from 0 and 1) and allow the learner to satisfy
the weaker variant of (ε, δ)-DP. The lower bound has two steps: (1) a proof that estimating the
mean of a somewhat balanced product distribution up to α in `2 distance (Lemma 6.2) and (2)
a proof that estimating a somewhat balanced product distribution in total-variation distance
implies estimating its mean in `2 distance (Lemma 6.4). Putting these two lemmata together
immediately implies the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. For any α ≤ 1 smaller than some absolute constant, any (ε, 364n)-DP mechanism
which estimates a product distribution to accuracy ≤ α in total variation distance with probability
≥ 2/3 requires n = Ω
(
d
αε log d
)
samples.
Proof. We will show that no algorithm can estimate the mean of a product distribution up to
accuracy α with probability 2/3 with fewer than O
(
d
αε log d
)
samples (for an appropriate choice
of the constant in the big-Oh notation). By Lemma 6.4, this would imply an algorithm with
the same sample complexity which estimates the distribution in total variation distance up to
accuracy Cα. The theorem statement follows after a rescaling of α.
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Suppose that such an algorithm existed. By repeating the algorithm O(log d) times, the
success probability could be boosted by a standard argument2 to ≥ 1− 1/d2, with the overall
algorithm requiring O
(
d
αε
)
samples. Since the domain is bounded, any answer will be, at worst,
an O(
√
d)-accurate estimate in `2-distance. This implies that the expected accuracy of the
resulting algorithm is at most O(α), which is precluded by Lemma 6.2, for an appropriate choice
of constant in the big-Oh notation.
Lemma 6.2. If M : {±1}n×d → [−13 , 13 ]d is
(
ε, 364n
)
-DP, and for every product distribution P
over {±1}d such that −13  E[P ]  13 ,
E
X∼P⊗n
[‖M(X)− E[P ]‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ d54
then n ≥ d72αε . Equivalently, if M is
(
ε, 364n
)
-DP and is such that for every product distribution
P over {0, 1}d such that 13  E[P ]  23 ,
E
X∼P⊗n
[‖M(X)− E[P ]‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ d216
then n ≥ d144αε .
Proof. We will only prove the first part of the theorem for estimation over {±1}d, and the second
part will follow immediately by a change of variables.
Let P 1, . . . , P d ∼ [−13 , 13 ] be chosen uniformly and independently from [−13 , 13 ]. Let P =
Ber(P 1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ber(P d) be the product distribution with mean P = (P 1, . . . , P d). Let
X1, . . . , Xn ∼ P be independent samples from this product distribution. Define:
Zji =
(
1
9 − (P j)2
1− (P j)2
)
(M j(X)− P j)(Xji − P j)
Zi =
d∑
j=1
Zji
where Zi is a measure of the correlation between the estimate M(X) and the i-th sample Xi.
We will use the following key lemma, which is an extension of a similar statement in [SU15] for
the uniform distribution over [−1, 1].
Lemma 6.3 (Fingerprinting Lemma). For every f : {±1}n → [−13 , 13 ], we have
E
P∼[− 1
3
, 1
3
],X1...n∼P
[(
1
9 − P 2
1− P 2
)
· (f(X)− P ) ·
n∑
i=1
(Xi − P ) + (f(X)− P )2
]
≥ 1
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Proof of Lemma 6.3. Define the function
g(p) = E
X1...n∼p
[f(X)].
2Specifically, repeat the algorithm O(log d) times, and choose any output which is close to at least half the
outputs. This is correct with high probability by using the Chernoff bound and the fact that the original algorithm
was accurate with probability ≥ 2/3.
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For brevity, we will write E
P
[·] to indicate that the expectation is being taken over P , where P is
chosen uniformly from [−13 , 13 ]. By [BSU17, Lemma A.1], for every fixed p,
h(p) := E
X1...n∼p
[(
1
9 − p2
1− p2
)
· (f(X)− p) ·
n∑
i=1
(Xi − p)
]
=
(
1
9
− p2
)
g′(p). (12)
Where we have defined the function h(p) for brevity. Now we have,
E
P
[h(P )] = E
P
[(
1
9
− P 2
)
g′(P )
]
=
3
2
1/3∫
−1/3
(
1
9
− p2
)
g′(p)dp
= 2 · E
P
[Pg(P )]. (13)
Now, using the above identity, we have:
E
P,X1...n∼P
[
(f(X)− P )2
]
= E
P,X1...n∼P
[
f(X)2
]
+ E
P
[
P 2
]− 2 · E
P
[Pg(P )]
≥ E
P
[
P 2
]− 2 · E
P
[Pg(P )]
= E
P
[
P 2
]− E
P
[h(P )] (Using (13))
Rearranging the above inequality gives:
E
P,X1...n∼P
[
(f(X)− P )2
]
+ E[h(P )] ≥ E
P
[
P 2
]
=
1
27
.
Henceforth, all expectations are taken over P , X, and M . We can now apply the lemma to
the function M j(X) for every j ∈ [d], use linearity of expectation, and the accuracy assumption
to get the bound,
n∑
i=1
E[Zi] =
d∑
j=1
E
[
n∑
i=1
Zji
]
≥ d
27
− E[‖M(X)− P‖22]
≥ d
27
− α2
≥ d
54
,
where the second inequality follows from the assumption E
[‖M(X)− P‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ d54 .
To complete the proof, we will give an upper bound on
∑n
i=1 E[Zi] that contradicts the lower
bound unless n is sufficiently large. Consider any i ∈ [n]. Define:
Z˜ji =
(
1
9 − (P j)2
1− (P j)2
)
(M(X∼i)− P j)(Xji − P j)
Z˜i =
d∑
j=1
Z˜ji
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where X∼i denotes X with the i-th sample replaced with an independent draw from P . Since
X∼i and Xi are conditionally independent conditioned on P , E
[
Z˜i
]
= 0. Also, we have:
E
[
|Z˜i|
]2 ≤ E[Z˜2i ] = Var[Z˜i] ≤ 19E[‖M(X)− P‖22] ≤ 19α2
where the first inequality is Jensen’s. Furthermore, we have the following upper bound on the
maximum value of Z˜i and Zi: ‖Zi‖∞ ≤ 8d/81 and ‖Z˜i‖∞ ≤ 8d/81.
Now we can apply differential privacy to bound E[Zi], using the fact that X and X∼i differ
on at most one sample. The approach is akin to Lemma 8 of [SU17b]. The main idea is
to split Zi into its positive and negative components Zi,+ and Zi,−, write each of them as
E[Zi,∗] =
∫ ‖Zi‖∞
0 P[Zi,∗ ≥ t] dt, and apply the definition of (ε, δ)-approximate differential privacy
to relate them to the similar quantities for Z˜i. Implementing this strategy gives the following:
E[Zi] ≤ E
[
Z˜i
]
+ 2ε · E
[
|Z˜i|
]
+ 2δ · ‖Zi‖∞
≤ 0 + 2ε · 1
3
α+
3
32n
· 8d
81
≤ 2
3
αε+
d
108n
.
Note that we used the upper bound eε − 1 ≤ 2ε for ε ≤ 1. Thus, we have:
n∑
i=1
E[Zi] ≤ 2
3
αεn+
d
108
.
Combining the upper and lower bounds gives:
d
54
≤ 2
3
αεn+
d
108
⇐⇒ n ≥ d
72αε
.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 6.4. Let P and Q be two product distributions with mean vectors p and q respectively,
such that pi ∈ [1/3, 2/3] for all i ∈ [d]. Suppose that
‖E[P ]− E[Q]‖2 ≥ α,
for any α ≤ α0, where 0 < α0 ≤ 1 is some absolute constant. Then dTV(P,Q) ≥ Cα, for some
absolute constant, C.
Proof. Consider the set, A = {x | log(P (x)/Q(x)) > α}. If we show that P (A) = Ω(1), then we
would have the following.
∀x ∈ A P (x)
Q(x)
> eα ≥ 1 + α
=⇒ ∀x ∈ A P (x)−Q(x) > α
1 + α
P (x) ≥ α
2
P (x)
=⇒ P (A)−Q(A) > α
2
P (A)
=⇒ P (A)−Q(A) > Ω(α)
=⇒ dTV(P,Q) > Ω(α).
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To this end, let x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ {0, 1}d. Then,
P (x) =
d∏
i=1
pxii (1− pi)1−xi and Q(x) =
d∏
i=1
qxii (1− qi)1−xi .
Therefore,
Z(x) := log(P (x)/Q(x)) = log(P (x))− log(Q(x))
=
d∑
i=1
xi log
pi
qi
+
d∑
i=1
(1− xi) log 1− pi
1− qi
= −
d∑
i=1
xi log
qi
pi
−
d∑
i=1
(1− xi) log 1− qi
1− pi .
Now, we lower bound Z(x) by some function of x, so that if that function takes a value larger
than α with probability Ω(1) (measured with respect to P ), then Z(x) ≥ α with probability
Ω(1). Noting that log(t) ≤ t− 1 for all t > 0, we get the following:
log(P (x)/Q(x)) ≥
d∑
i=1
xi
(
1− qi
pi
)
+
d∑
i=1
(1− xi)
(
1− 1− qi
1− pi
)
=
d∑
i=1
(xi − pi)(pi − qi)
pi(1− pi)
Let Yi =
(Xi−pi)(pi−qi)
pi(1−pi) be a transformation of the random variable Xi ∼ Pi. To be precise, it will
have the following PMF:
Yi =
{
pi−qi
pi
w.p. pi
−pi−qi1−pi w.p. 1− pi.
Yi has the following properties:
E[Yi] = 0, σ2i = E
[
Y 2i
]
=
(pi − qi)2
pi(1− pi) , and E
[
Y 3i
]
=
(pi − qi)3
[
p2i + (1− pi)2
]
p2i (1− pi)2
.
Let σ2 =
∑
i∈[d] σ
2
i , and Y =
1
σ
d∑
i=1
Yi. Hence, Z(x) ≥ σY for all x. At this point, it suffices to
show that P[Y > α/σ] ≥ Ω(1). We will do this in two parts: we show that if Y was a Gaussian
with the same mean and variance, then this inequality would hold, and we also show that Y is
well-approximated by said Gaussian. We start with the latter.
We apply the Berry-Esseen theorem [Ber41, Ess42, She10] to approximate the distribution of
Y by the standard normal distribution. Let ψ be the actual CDF of Y , and φ be the CDF of the
standard normal distribution:
|ψ(y)− φ(y)| ≤ C1σ−1 ·max
i
E
[
Y 3i
]
E
[
Y 2i
]
= C1σ
−1 ·max
i
(pi − qi)
[
p2i + (1− pi)2
]
pi(1− pi)
≤ 5C1
2
σ−1 ·max
i
(pi − qi)
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Here, C1 = 0.56 is a universal constant. Now, we can assume that pi − qi ≤ C2α (for some
constant C2 of our choosing), otherwise dTV(P,Q) > C2α trivially. Note that, by our assumption
on pi ∈ [1/3, 2/3], we have the following:
σ2 =
∑
i∈[d]
(pi − qi)2
pi(1− pi) ≥
9
2
∑
i∈[d]
(pi − qi)2 = 9
2
α2.
Therefore, σ ≥ 2α, and we get the following:
|ψ(y)− φ(y)| ≤ 5C1C2
4
.
We now use this to prove an Ω(1) lower bound on P[Y > α/σ].
1− ψ(α/σ) > 1− φ(α/σ)− 5C1C2
4
= 1− 1√
2pi
α/σ∫
0
e−t
2
dt− 5C1C2
4
≥ 1/2− 1√
2pi
α
σ
− 5C1C2
4
≥ 1/2− 1
2
√
2pi
− 5C1C2
4
≥ 0.30− 5C1C2
4
We want the above quantity to be a constant greater than zero. We could pick any “small enough”
constant, so we pick 0.1. Therefore, by choosing C2 < 0.16/C1 (say 0.25), we guarantee that
P[Y > α/σ] > 0.1. Hence, we have dTV(P,Q) > 0.05α, which completes the proof.
6.2 Privately Learning Gaussian Distributions with Known Covariance
In this section, we will show a lower bound on the number of samples required to estimate the
mean of a Gaussian distribution when its covariance matrix is known. The approach is similar
to the product distribution case (Section 6.1), but with modifications required for the different
structure and unbounded data.
Theorem 6.5. For any α ≤ 1 smaller than some absolute constant, any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism
(for δ ≤ O˜
(√
d
Rn
)
) which estimates a Gaussian distribution (with mean µ ∈ [−R,R]d and known
covariance σ2I) to accuracy ≤ α in total variation distance with probability ≥ 2/3 requires
n = Ω
(
d
αε log(dR)
)
samples.
While the expression for δ might seem complex, one can note that if R = 1 and for d ≥ 1, we
have δ = O
(
1
n
√
logn
)
, very similar to the statement of Lemma 6.2. Our statement is stronger
and more general for settings of d and R.
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Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 6.1, so we only sketch the differences. To
estimate the Gaussian to total variation distance α, it is necessary to estimate the mean in
`2-distance to accuracy ασ, evidenced by the following folklore fact (see, e.g., [DKK
+18]):
Fact 6.6. The total variation distance between N (µ1, σ2I) and N (µ2, σ2I) is at least C ‖µ1−µ2‖2σ ,
for an appropriate constant C, and all µ1, µ2, σ such that
‖µ1−µ2‖2
σ is smaller than some absolute
constant.
Similar to before, we can argue that the existence of such an algorithm implies the existence of
an algorithm which is correct in expectation, at a multiplicative cost of O(log dR) in the sample
complexity, as any estimate output by the algorithm is accurate up to O(
√
dR) in `2-distance.
Such an algorithm is precluded by Lemma 6.7 (noting that we must rescale α by a factor of σ),
concluding the proof.
Lemma 6.7. If M : Rn×d → [−Rσ,Rσ]d is (ε, δ)-DP for δ ≤
√
d
48
√
2Rn
√
log(48
√
2Rn/
√
d)
, and for
every Gaussian distribution P with known covariance matrix, σ2I, such that −Rσ ≤ E[P ] ≤ Rσ,
E
X∼P⊗n
[‖M(X)− E[P ]‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ dσ2R26 ,
then n ≥ dσ24αε .
Proof. By a scaling argument, we will focus on the case where σ = 1. We prove the following
statement: If M : Rn×d → [−R,R]d is (ε, δ)-DP for δ ≤
√
d
48
√
2Rn
√
log(48
√
2Rn/
√
d)
, and for every
Gaussian distribution P with known covariance matrix I such that −R ≤ E[P ] ≤ R,
E
X∼P⊗n
[‖M(X)− E[P ]‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ dR26 ,
implies n ≥ d24αε .
Let µ1, . . . , µd be chosen independently and uniformly at random from the interval [−R,+R].
Let P be the Gaussian distribution with mean vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µd), and covariance matrix I.
Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent samples from this Gaussian distribution. As in the proof of the
lower bound for product distributions, we define the following quantities.
Zji =
(
R2 − (µj)2)(M j(X)− µj)(Xji − µj)
Zi =
d∑
j=1
Zji
Again, our strategy would be to give upper and lower bounds on
∑n
i=1 E[Zi], which would
conradict each other unless n is larger than some specific quantity. To obtain the lower bound,
we first prove a lemma similar to Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 6.8 (Fingerprinting Lemma for Gaussians). For every f : Rn → [−R,R], we have
E
µ∼[R,R],X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[(
R2 − µ2) · (f(X)− µ) · n∑
i=1
(Xi − µ) + (f(X)− µ)2
]
≥ R
2
3
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Proof of Lemma 6.8. Define the function
g(µ) = E
X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[f(X)].
For brevity, we will write E
µ
[·] to indicate that the expectation is being taken over µ, where µ is
chosen uniformly from [−R,R]. We use an adaptation of (12) to the Gaussian setting. From an
extension of a similar statement in the full version of [DSS+15], for every fixed µ,
h(µ) := E
X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[(
R2 − µ2) · (f(X)− µ) · n∑
i=1
(Xi − µ)
]
=
(
R2 − µ2) ∂
∂µ
g(µ).
Therefore, we get:
E
µ
[h(µ)] = 2E
µ
[µg(µ)].
Now, using the above, we get:
E
µ,X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[
(f(X)− µ)2
]
= E
µ,X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[
f(X)2
]
+ E
µ
[
µ2
]− 2 · E
µ
[µg(µ)]
≥ E
µ
[
µ2
]− 2 · E
µ
[µg(µ)]
= E
µ
[
µ2
]− E
µ
[h(µ)].
Rearranging the above inequality gives:
E
µ,X1...n∼N (µ,1)
[
(f(X)− µ)2
]
+ E
µ
[h(µ)] ≥ E
µ
[
µ2
]
=
R2
3
.
Henceforth, all expectations are taken over µ, X, and M . In the same way as in case of
product distributions, we obtain the following bound,
n∑
i=1
E[Zi] =
d∑
j=1
E
[
n∑
i=1
Zji
]
≥ dR
2
3
− E[‖M(X)− µ‖22]
≥ dR
2
3
− α2
≥ dR
2
6
, (14)
where the second inequality follows from the assumption E
[‖M(X)− P‖22] ≤ α2 ≤ dR26 . Now,
to give an upper bound, we first define:
Z˜ji =
(
R2 − (µj)2)(M(X∼i)− µj)(Xji − µj)
Z˜i =
d∑
j=1
Z˜ji
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where X∼i denotes X with the i-th sample replaced with an independent draw from P . Because
X∼i and Xi are independent conditioned on P , E
[
Z˜i
]
= 0. Using similar calculations as in
Lemma 6.2, we get the following.
E
[
|Z˜i|
]2 ≤ R4α2
Observe that, in contrast to Lemma 6.2, we do not have a worst-case bound on the value of the
statistic Zi, as the support of X
j
i is the real line, rather than just {±1} as before. Consequently,
we split the computation of the expectation of Zi,+ into the intervals [0, T ] and (T,∞), and only
apply (ε, δ)-DP to the former. Again, we use the ideas of the same lemma about splitting Zi
into Zi,+ and Zi,− to get the following, for any T > 0.
E[Zi] ≤ E
[
Z˜i
]
+ 2ε · E
[
|Z˜i|
]
+ 2δ · T + 2
∫ ∞
T
P[Zi,+ > t]dt (15)
Now,
Zi,+ ≤ max

d∑
j=1
(R2 − (µj)2)(Xji − µj)(M j(X)− µj), 0

≤ max
2R3
d∑
j=1
(Xji − µj), 0

= max{Yi, 0},
where Yi ∼ N (0, 4R6d). Let Wi = Yi2R3√d , and S =
T
2R3
√
d
. This transformation results in Wi
being a standard normal random variable. We perform a change of variables, and repeatedly use
the inequality erfc(x) ≤ exp(−x2) in the following derivation:∫ ∞
T
P[Zi,+ > t]dt = 2R3
√
d
∫ ∞
S
P[Wi > s]ds
≤ R3
√
d
∫ ∞
S
e−s
2/2ds
= R3
√
d
√
pi
2
erfc
(
S√
2
)
≤ R3
√
dpi
2
e−
S2
2 .
= R3
√
dpi
2
e−
T2
8R6d .
We will upper-bound this by δT :
R3
√
dpi
2
e−
T2
8R6d ≤ δT
Equivalently,
R3
δ
√
dpi
2
≤ Te T
2
8R6d
36
Consider setting T = 2
√
2R3
√
d
√
log(1/δ). The right-hand side of this inequality becomes
2
√
2R3
√
d
√
log(1/δ) · 1
δ
,
which is greater than the left-hand side for any δ < 1.
Using (15), this gives us the following upper bound:
n∑
i=1
E[Zi] ≤ 2R2αεn+ 4
√
2R3
√
dnδ
√
log(1/δ)
On the other hand, (14) gives us a lower bound on this quantity, and thus we require that the
following inequality is satisfied:
dR2
12
≤ n
(
R2αε+ 2
√
2R3
√
dδ
√
log(1/δ)
)
Our goal is to find conditions on δ such that the product involving this term is at most dR
2
24 . If
this holds, the corresponding term can be moved to the left-hand side, and we are left with the
following inequality:
dR2
24
≤ nR2αε,
which is satisfied when
n ≥ d
24αε
,
as we desired.
Thus, it remains to find conditions on δ which satisfy the following inequality:
2
√
2R3
√
dδ
√
log(1/δ) ≤ dR
2
24n
.
Rearranging, we get:
δ
√
log(1/δ) ≤
√
d
48
√
2Rn
, φ.
Consider setting δ = φ
2
√
log(1/φ)
. This results in
δ
√
log(1/δ) ≤ φ
2
√
log(1/φ)
·
√
log(1/φ) + log(2
√
log(1/φ))
=
φ
2
·
√
1 +
log(2
√
log(1/φ))
log(1/φ)
≤ φ,
where the last inequality is because
√
1 + 2
√
x
x ≤ 2 for all x ≥ 0.
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6.3 Privately Learning Gaussian Distributions with Unknown Covariance
In this section, we prove lower bounds for privately learning a Gaussian with unknown
covariance.
Theorem 6.9. For any α ≤ 1 smaller than some absolute constant, any ε-DP mechanism which
estimates a Gaussian distribution to accuracy ≤ α in total variation distance with probability
≥ 2/3 requires n = Ω
(
d2
αε
)
samples.
Proof. The proof is again similar to that of Theorem 6.1, and we sketch the differences. The
primary difference is that instead of considering algorithms which estimate the covariance matrix
of the distribution in Frobenius norm, we consider algorithms which estimate the inverse of the
covariance matrix. The reason is the following theorem of [DMR18], which states that if one
fails to estimate the inverse of the covariance matrix of a Gaussian in Frobenius norm, then one
fails to estimate the Gaussian in total variation distance:
Theorem 6.10 (Theorem 3.8 of [DMR18]). Suppose there are two mean-zero Gaussian dis-
tributions N1 and N2, with covariance matrices Σ1 and Σ2, respectively. Furthermore, sup-
pose that Σ−11 − I and Σ−12 − I are both zero-diagonal and have Frobenius norm smaller
than some absolute constant. Then the total variation distance between N1 and N2 is at least
c1‖Σ−11 − Σ−12 ‖F − c2(‖Σ−11 − I‖2F + ‖Σ−12 − I‖2F ), for constants c1, c2 > 0.
Therefore, it suffices to show that there does not exist an algorithm which estimates the
inverse of the covariance in Frobenius norm with probability ≥ 2/3, where the inverse of the
covariance matrix obeys the conditions of Theorem 6.10. As before, an algorithm which is
accurate in expectation would imply the existence of such an algorithm, so we show that such an
algorithm does not exist. We do this by applying a modification of Lemma 6.11. While this lemma
is stated in terms of estimating the covariance matrix, we can obtain an identical statement for
estimating the inverse of a covariance matrix by repeating the argument, with Σ replaced by Σ−1
at all points. Note that the construction in Lemma 6.11 obeys the conditions of Theorem 6.10.
Furthermore, the Frobenius norm diameter of the construction is Θ(α) (rather than poly(d) as
in Theorem 6.1), we do not lose an O(log d) factor when converting to an algorithm which is
accurate in expectation. Therefore, the application of this modification completes the proof.
Lemma 6.11. If M : Rn×d → S is ε-DP (where S is the space of all d× d symmetric positive
semi-definite matrices), and for every N (0,Σ) over Rd such that 12I  Σ  32I,
E
X∼N (0,Σ)⊗n
[‖M(X)− Σ‖2F ] ≤ α2/64,
then n ≥ Ω
(
d2
αε
)
.
Proof. Let P be the uniform distribution over the set of d × d symmetric matrices with 0 on
the diagonal, where the d2 − d non-zero entries are {± α2d}. Note that there are (d2 − d)/2 free
parameters, and thus 2(d
2−d)/2 matrices. For each v ∈ supp(P ), we will define Σ(v) = I + v.
It is easy to check that for all v ∈ supp(P ), that 12I  Σ  32I, and furthermore, that for
any v, v′ ∈ supp(P ), dTV(N (0,Σ(v)),N (0,Σ(v′)) ≤ O(α) (Lemma 2.9). We assume that our
algorithm is aware of this construction, and thus will always output a symmetric matrix with 1’s
on the diagonal and off-diagonal entries bounded in magnitude by α/2d.
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Define the random variables Z and Z ′, which are sampled according to the following process.
Let V and V ′ be independently sampled accordingly to P . X is a set of n samples from
N (0,Σ(V )), and similarly, X ′ is a set of n independent samples from N (0,Σ(V ′)). Then, M(X)
and M(X ′) are computed with their own (independent) randomness. We then define:
Z = 〈M(X), V 〉 = 2
∑
i<j
Mij(X) · Vij ,
Z ′ = 〈M(X ′), V 〉 = 2
∑
i<j
Mij(X
′) · Vij .
We start with the following claim which lower bounds the expectation of Z.
Claim 6.12. E[Z] ≥ α216 − 12‖M(X)− Σ(V )‖2F ≥ 7α
2
128 .
Proof.
E
[
2Z + ‖M(X)− Σ(V )‖2F
]
=
∑
i<j
E
[
4Mij(X)Vij + 2(Mij(X)− Σij(V ))2
]
=
∑
i<j
E
[
2M2ij(X) + 2Σ
2
ij(V )
]
≥
∑
i<j
E
[
2Σ2ij(V )
]
=
∑
i<j
α2
2d2
=
α2
2
· d
2 − d
2d2
≥ α
2
8
,
where the last inequality holds for any d ≥ 2. The claimed statement follows by rearrangement,
and the second inequality by the assumption on ‖M(X)− Σ(V )‖2F .
Next, we show that Z ′ will not be too large, with high probability.
Claim 6.13. P
[
Z ′ > α2/32
] ≤ exp(−Ω(d2)).
We begin by observing M(X ′) and V are independent. Condition on any realization of M(X ′).
Then Z ′ |M(X ′) is the sum of (d2 − d)/2 independent summands, each with contained in the
range [−α2/4d2, α2/4d2] and with expectation 0 (since E[Vij ] = 0). By Hoeffding’s inequality, we
have that
P
[
Z ′ > α2/32 |M(X ′)] ≤ exp(− 2 α41024
d2−d
2 · α
4
4d4
)
≤ exp(−Ω(d2)).
The claim follows by noting that value of M(X ′) which we conditioned on was arbitrary.
Claim 6.14. P
[
Z > α2/32
] ≤ exp(O(αεn)) · P[Z ′ > α2/32].
Proof. We start by proving the following lemma:
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Lemma 6.15. Let M : Rn×d → A be an ε-DP mechanism. Suppose that D,D′ are probability
distributions over Rd such that dTV(D,D′) = α. Then for S ⊆ A,
P
M,X∼Dn
[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp(O(εαn)) P
M,X′∼D′n
[
M(X ′) ∈ S].
Proof. By the definition of D and D′, this implies that there exists distributions A,B,C such
that
D = αB + (1− α)A
D′ = αC + (1− α)A
We will actually prove the following for any subset S ⊆ A:
P
M,X∼Dn
[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp(O(εαn)) P
M,X′∼An
[
M(X ′) ∈ S].
A symmetric argument, with D′ in place of D, and using the other direction of the definition of
differential privacy will give the lemma statement (with an extra factor of 2 in the exponent).
We will draw X,X ′ from a coupling of (D,A). In particular, let W ∈ {0, 1}n be a random
vector, where each entry is independently set to be 1 with probability α and 0 otherwise. Note
that Y (w) ,
∑
iwi is distributed as Bin(n, α). Then there exists a coupling C of (D,A) such
that X ′ ∼ An, and Xi is equal to X ′i when Wi = 1, and is an independent draw from B otherwise.
P
X∼Dn
M
[M(X) ∈ S] =
∑
w
P[W = w] P
(X,X′)∼C
M
[M(X) ∈ S | w]
≤
∑
w
P[W = w] exp(εY (w)) P
(X,X′)∼C
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S | w]
= P
X′∼An
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S]∑
w
P[W = w] exp(εY (w))
= P
X′∼An
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S]E[exp(εY (w))]
= (1− α+ αeε)n P
X′∼An
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S]
≤ exp(α(eε − 1)n) P
X′∼An
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S]
≤ exp(O(αεn)) P
X′∼An
M
[
M(X ′) ∈ S],
as desired. The first inequality uses the definition of differential privacy. We also used the
moment generating function of the binomial distribution, and the fact that eε − 1 = O(ε) for
ε < 1.
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With this in hand, the proof is as follows:
P
V,V ′∼P
X∼N (0,Σ(V ))
M
[
Z > α2/32
]
=
∑
v,v′
P
V,V ′∼P
[
V = v, V ′ = v′
]
P
X∼N (0,Σ(V ))
M
[
Z > α2/32 | V, V ′]
≤ exp(O(αεn))
∑
v,v′
P
V,V ′∼P
[
V = v, V ′ = v′
]
P
X∼N (0,Σ(V ′))
M
[
Z ′ > α2/32 | V, V ′]
= exp(O(αεn)) P
V,V ′∼P
X∼N (0,Σ(V ′))
M
[
Z ′ > α2/32
]
The inequality follows using the lemma above, and noting that for any v, v′ ∈ supp(P ), that
dTV(N (0,Σ(V )),N (0,Σ(V ′))) ≤ O(α).
With this in hand, we make the following observations. Claim 6.12 implies that Ω(1) ≤
P
[
Z > α2/32
]
. Claim 6.13 states that P
[
Z ′ > α2/32
] ≤ exp(−Ω(d2)). Using these together
with Claim 6.14 gives us that Ω(1) ≤ exp(O(αεn) − Ω(d2)), which implies that we require
n ≥ Ω(d2/αε) to avoid a contradiction.
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